Conscious perception in the predictive brain by Meijs, E.L.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/200823
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-02 and may be subject to
change.


Conscious perception in the predictive brain
Erik L. Meijs
Conscious perception in the predictive brain
PhD thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen
© Erik L. Meijs, 2019
ISBN: 978-94-6284-184-0
Cover: Erik Meijs. Template brain image from SVGrepo.com (CC BY 4.0)
Print: Ipskamp printing BV
The research described in this thesis was carried out at the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging. Data in chapter 2 was acquired at 
the University of Amsterdam. The PhD-project was funded by a TopTalent grant from the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience 
(Donders Centre for Medical Neuroscience / RadboudUMC) awarded to Erik Meijs. In addition, research was funded based on grants awarded to 
various co-authors by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, the European Research Council and the James S. McDonnel foundation.
Conscious perception in the predictive brain
Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 25 maart 2019
om 14:30 uur precies
door
Erik Lambertus Meijs
geboren op 5 juni 1990
te Tilburg, Nederland
Promotor
Prof. dr. Floris P. de Lange
Copromotor
Dr. Simon van Gaal (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Manuscriptcommissie
Prof. dr. W. Pieter Medendorp
Prof. dr. Victor A. F. Lamme (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Dr. Manon G. J. Mulckhuyse (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Table of contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 7
Chapter 2 Dynamic interactions between top-down expectations and 
conscious awareness
17
Chapter 3 Exploring the effect of expectations and stimulus relevance on 
stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report
41
Chapter 4 Cue predictability does not modulate bottom-up attentional 
capture
67
Chapter 5 General discussion 89
Appendix References 102
Nederlandse samenvatting 110
Publication list 113
CV 114
Acknowledgements 115
Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience 119

1
Introduction
10
Chapter 1  •  Introduction
In our everyday live, we normally have the experience that we have a rich perception 
of the world around us, driven by an accurate representation of it. However, it has 
been known for a long time that perception is not a passive process in which signals 
coming in through the senses are merely registered. Rather, perception is thought 
to be an active process in which the brain tries to make sense of the inputs from the 
environment it is in [1]. As a result, perception seems to be as much an interpretation 
as a representation of the outside world.
The idea that there is no one-to-one mapping between perception and the outside 
world can be illustrated with simple visual illusions. In these illusions, the perceptual 
system is misled, because assumptions the brain normally makes when interpreting 
(visual) input lead to an erroneous conclusion about specific stimuli. In the examples 
in Figure 1.1, the context in which a stimulus (a circle in A and a line in B) is presented 
has a big influence on how the stimulus is interpreted. But there are even more 
basic examples that demonstrate that perception deviates from sensory inputs. For 
example, think about the fact that we automatically fill in the input missing due to 
light falling onto the blind spot of the retina, leading us to have a “complete” visual 
experience even though part of the input is missing.
Predictive brain theories
The hypothesis that the brain tries to understand its environment is also a prominent 
feature of recently developed neurocomputational theories like predictive coding 
[2,3] and adaptive resonance theory [4]. One central tenet in these theories is that the 
brain uses its knowledge about the environment to build expectations about upcoming 
inputs. Therefore, I will collectively refer to them as “predictive brain theories”. 
Expectations are typically thought to originate from higher-level brain regions, either 
A. Ebbinghaus illusion B. Müller-Lyer illusion
Figure 1.1: Visual illusions. (A) Ebbinghaus illusion (also called Titchener circles). Both centered circles 
are of equal size, but the surrounding circles make the center circle on the left look smaller than the 
center circle on the right. (B) Müller-Lyer illusion. Both lines are of equal length, but the positioning of 
the arrows heads makes the top line appear shorter and the bottom line appear longer.
11
Chapter 1 • Introduction
within the sensory cortex or in associative areas such as the (pre)frontal cortex, and 
they may guide information processing in lower-level sensory regions via top-down 
projections. These expectations can both help and harm perception [5]. Consider, for 
example, a situation where you are taking a walk in the park and hear a barking sound. 
The auditory system processes the sound and eventually you recognize the sound 
as that of a dog. This then generates a visual expectation about what you will see 
when we turn out head towards the sound source: a dog. When indeed there is a dog 
present, this may lead to an improved neural representation in visual regions while 
overall brain activity is reduced [6]. On the other hand, when you do not see a dog but 
a loudspeaker, a prediction error signal will trigger the brain to update its expectations 
about the source of the sound [7].
While a surge of scientific work now supports many of the central assumptions of 
predictive brain theories [8,9], there are still many open questions regarding specific 
aspects of these theories. In this thesis, I will focus on a number of these questions.
Expectations and conscious awareness
One unresolved issue relates to the relation between expectations and conscious 
awareness. Some prediction-based theories posit that expectations are intrinsic 
and automatic brain computations [9]. This suggests that they should take place 
irrespective of a person’s behavioral state. Indeed, subjectively perception feels like an 
effortless process that does not require much willful intervention. That is, perceptual 
expectations seem to arise automatically, in the absence of conscious awareness or 
focused attention. Still, to date there has been no conclusive empirical support for this 
hypothesis. A number of studies have shown that low-level invalidations of regularities 
can be processed outside of conscious awareness [10,11], but it is unclear whether 
these findings reflect true model-based comparisons of expectations to new input or 
more basic low-level adaption effects [12,13].
In addition, the notion of nonconscious expectations appears incompatible with many 
of the leading theories of conscious awareness (see Box 1.1 for a general overview). 
Many predictive brain theories posit that expectations are implemented by feedback 
loops from other areas [3,4]. These feedback loops can be implemented both on a low, 
local level [14] for low-level expectations, by longer-range expectations originating 
in higher-order areas (e.g. frontal cortex) to implement more cognitive, conscious 
12
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Box 1.1: The scientific study of consciousness
Decades of scientific work have been aimed at explaining the properties of 
conscious perception (subjective experience) and its relation to the brain. This 
journey has often been characterized as the search for the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCCs): the minimal set of neural mechanisms that are jointly 
sufficient for a conscious percept [18]. Below, I will give a short overview of how 
consciousness is usually studied and what the current leading theories about 
conscious awareness entail.
Studying consciousness
The techniques to manipulate the level of conscious access to sensory inputs can 
be roughly divided into two types of experiments. The first type of experiments 
degrades the stimulus input itself, for example by presenting it very shortly or 
embedding it within noise. Best known are masking paradigms, in which a weak 
stimulus is preceded and/or followed by much stronger masking stimuli. Often, 
this condition is compared to a condition where the stimulus input is stronger and 
masks are absent of weaker [19]. This results in differences in bottom-up input 
that can be confounded with the effect of conscious awareness. To prevent this 
potential confound, another type of experiments exploits more natural variations 
in conscious awareness, for example due to momentary lapses of attention. This is 
for example the case in the attentional blink paradigm [20] (used in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3), in which conscious perception of the second of two targets stimuli is 
impaired due to temporary unavailability of processing resources. A downside of 
methods like this is a lack of experimental control over conscious awareness.
The (un)consciousness of a percept can be determined based on either objective 
or subjective measures [21,22]. In the former, participants perform a (detection) 
task on the supposedly (non)conscious stimulus and their performance is 
compared to chance level. In a nonconscious condition, participants should 
then not detect stimuli better than chance. A more subjective way to determine 
conscious awareness of stimuli is to rely on participants’ subjective estimates. Of 
course, the usefulness of this method relies on the reliability of subjective reports, 
which may be compromised by for example decision or response biases [22].
13
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Scientific theories about conscious awareness
There are a number of well-known and empirically supported theories about 
conscious awareness, such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) [24], Global 
Workspace Theory [19,25,26] and the theory of recurrent processing [17]. While 
various theories differ markedly, they appear to agree on a number of general 
features or properties of conscious perception. Generally speaking, they suggest 
that conscious processing relates to more integrated and complex neural processing 
(see also Figure 1.2). For consciously perceived stimuli, the neural signals are more 
powerful, long-lasting and there is widespread recurrent processing between brain 
regions at many levels of the cortical hierarchy [16].
A. No conscious access B. Conscious access
expectations [15]. Interestingly, leading theories of consciousness implicate similar 
top-down feedback mechanisms in the constitution of conscious access [16,17]. 
Information that cannot be consciously accessed is thought to trigger only feedforward 
activity or localized recurrent interactions within sensory brain areas. Therefore, based 
on consciousness theories, nonconscious effects of expectations are highly unlikely 
because the feedback mechanisms they rely on are not present. In contrast, predictive 
brain theories would suggest that the processing of expectations is intrinsic and 
essential to brain functioning, and should therefore be automatic and not dependent 
Figure 1.2: Perceptual processing with and without conscious access. (A) Without conscious access, 
visual inputs may sometimes trigger local interactive processing, though this is weak and limited to 
posterior (sensory) regions (preconscious processing). This can only occur when the bottom-up input 
is strong enough. Signals reaching up to higher levels are weak and only feedforward. (B) Conscious 
perception is related to strong, lasting and widespread activation of the brain, extending up higher-
level areas. There is recurrent processing between those high-level areas and those at lower levels. 
The figure was modelled after figure 1 in Dehaene et al. [23]. While this is an example for the visual 
domain, the same principles are assumed to hold for other sensory modalities.
14
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on conscious awareness. These conflicting hypotheses will be tested against each 
other in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I report a series of experiments investigating the 
dynamic interaction between conscious awareness and perceptual expectations. In 
these experiments, participants learn conditional probabilities between two sets of 
target stimuli. Consequently, once they have seen the initial target, they can form 
an expectation about the most likely target stimulus to follow. I will study whether 
the use of this type of predictive information depends on conscious awareness of the 
initial predictive stimulus. Additionally, I will investigate to what extent a violation of 
expectations is processed when the second stimulus is not consciously perceived.
Expectations and conscious access
Earlier in this introduction I have mentioned that perceptual experience can deviate 
substantially from the actual sensory inputs reaching the senses. Likewise, it has been 
shown that while perceptual experiences feel rich and complete, conscious perception 
is often quite limited and “obvious” inputs are not always consciously processed. That 
is, stimuli of which the bottom-up input in principle is strong enough to be perceived 
may nevertheless not be consciously accessible, for example due to momentary lapses 
of attention. Attention is often assumed to be required for conscious perception 
[19,23]. A well-known example of salient but unexpected stimuli being missed is the 
case of inattentional blindness. In the original paradigm participants watch a video 
and count how often a group of people pass a ball around. Because they are focusing 
on this task, they fail to see (or at least report) a person in the video who walks around 
in a gorilla suit [27].
A. Mooney image B. Original image
Recently, it has been shown that stimulus detection can be improved when prior 
expectations match the stimulus input [e.g. 28,29]. This is in line with predictive brain 
Figure 1.3: Expectations and stimulus detection. In (A) an example Mooney image is presented. While 
the stimulus in this figure may not be very easy, having prior knowledge of the stimulus to look for will 
improve the speed and accuracy of stimulus detection. (B) Original image of a young leopard from which 
the Mooney image was constructed.
15
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theories, which commonly assume that what we consciously see is strongly linked 
to the brain’s expectations about the outside world [30]. This idea can be illustrated 
with the Mooney image [31] shown in Figure 1.3. In such an ambiguous image, it is 
often difficult to distinguish the stimulus figure from the background. However, having 
advance knowledge on the stimulus to expect makes it easier to consciously see it. It 
is still an open question to what extent expectations can also boost otherwise unseen 
stimuli into consciousness, thus enabling the switch from a nonconscious to a conscious 
stimulus representation. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will explore these questions using 
the attentional blink paradigm. In this task, participants often fail to detect target 
stimuli. I will investigate whether this limitation can be overcome when participants 
have a prior expectation about the upcoming target stimulus. Furthermore, I will 
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying the observed effects.
Expectations and bottom-up attention
Expectations may also affect the processing of stimuli in other ways, such as by 
modulating bottom-up attentional mechanisms. Bottom-up attention is an automatic, 
reflexive type of attention which is triggered by suddenly presented salient stimuli 
[32]. In a standard visual bottom-up attention task, a cue is flashed somewhere on 
the screen and then followed after some time by a target stimulus. If the target is 
presented in the same location as the cue, performance is improved because the cue 
already attracted attention [33,34].
Bottom-up allocation of attention can be conceptualized as a way to redistribute 
neural resources: attention is attracted to a different part of the sensory input (and 
hence disengaged from previously attended items). Empirical evidence suggests that 
unexpected events require more processing resources [35]. Thus, it is possible that 
unexpected inputs trigger a bottom-up attention mechanism in order to reallocate 
processing capacity to a part of the sensory input that is not yet “explained”. This 
would be a way for the perceptual system to remain sensitive to sensory inputs next to 
its ongoing perceptual processes. According to predictive coding theory, the brain may 
assume that strong signals have high precision and consequently a location where 
this signal occurs may be temporarily given higher gain [36]. Therefore, prediction 
errors for new inputs in the same location may be upregulated, eventually leading to 
stronger suppression by the perceptual hypothesis predicting the input. This in turn is 
then more likely to be the hypothesis that is also consciously experienced [30].
16
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It is also possible that rather than strong inputs, predictable inputs are preferentially 
weighted because they are considered to be more reliable [37]. That is, attention 
may reflect gain modulations of expectations (in contrast to prediction errors) and 
thereby make expected inputs more salient. This would help to prevent distraction 
by unexpected or unexplained inputs. As may be clear, so far there is no consensus 
what the role of bottom-up attention in the predictive brain is. Subtle differences in 
assumptions about what the brain considers “reliable” or “useful” information can 
lead to directly opposing hypotheses. In Chapter 4 of this thesis I will delve into this 
unresolved issue by investigating the role of spatial and temporal expectations in 
visual bottom-up attention affects.
Main research aims and thesis outline
In this thesis, I report a series of seven experiments distributed over three experimental 
chapters. In the experiments, I used psychophysics, electroencephalography and 
magnetoencephalography (see Box 1.2) to investigate a number of hypotheses 
relating to the predictive brain hypothesis and its relation to conscious awareness and 
bottom-up attention.
Specifically, in this thesis I aimed at answering the following questions:
1. Can expectations boost an otherwise unseen stimulus into conscious awareness 
 (Chapter 2)?
2. Are expectations automatic brain computations, taking place irrespective of
 conscious access (Chapter 2)?
3. How do expectations affect the neural processing of visual stimuli and how does
 this relate to conscious access (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)?
4. To what extent is bottom-up attentional capture determined by perceptual
 expectations (Chapter 4)?
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I will give an overview of the main conclusions that can 
be drawn from the experiments I have conducted and suggest directions for future 
research.
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Box 1.2: EEG and MEG
Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) are 
neuroimaging methods that can be used to measure indexes of neuronal activity. 
Extracellular voltage differences, generated mainly by synaptic activity, can be 
measured at the scalp level by the use of a set of electrodes (EEG) [38]. Every 
electrical signal generates a magnetic field. The tiny variations in magnetic field 
generated through neural activity can be measured from outside the head with 
MEG. Both EEG and MEG have a high temporal resolution (< 10 ms) but relatively 
low spatial resolution, though the large number of sensors in MEG allow for better 
spatial inference than is possible in EEG.
How do we interpret the EEG and MEG signals?
In this thesis, I use two different analyses types to interpret the signals measured 
with EEG or MEG. In the first analysis method, used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
the signal per channel is averaged over trials relative to a relevant time-point (for 
example the onset of a visual stimulus). Because noise is supposedly not time-
locked to this event it is cancelled out and only the signal related to the relevant 
event. The average signal that is left is called the event-related potential (ERP for 
EEG) or event-related field (ERF for MEG).
A second analysis method, which I used in Chapter 3, is decoding. This is a 
multivariate analysis that does not just look at the average signal per channel over 
trials, but rather takes into account the trial-by-trial signal over multiple channels. 
Simply put, in the decoding analysis a subset of all trials is given to a computer 
algorithm that learns to distinguish multiple categories (e.g. conditions in an 
experiment) based on the trial data. A new set of trials is then used to see if the 
algorithm can successfully label them. If this is the case, it can be assumed that 
the neural data contained information about the categories of interest.

2
Dynamic interactions between 
top-down expectations and 
conscious awareness
Adapted from: 
Meijs EL, Slagter HA, de Lange FP, & van Gaal S. (2018). Dynamic Interactions between Top–Down 
Expectations and Conscious Awareness. Journal of Neuroscience, 38, 2318–2327.
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Abstract
It is well known that top-down expectations affect perceptual processes. Yet, remarkably 
little is known about the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness. 
We address three crucial questions that are outstanding: 1) How do expectations affect 
the likelihood of conscious stimulus perception?; 2) Does the brain register violations 
of expectations nonconsciously?; and 3) Do expectations need to be conscious 
to influence perceptual decisions? We performed three experiments, in human 
participants, in which we manipulated stimulus predictability within the attentional 
blink paradigm, while combining visual psychophysics with electrophysiological 
recordings. We found that valid stimulus expectations increase the likelihood of 
conscious access of stimuli. Furthermore, our findings suggest a clear dissociation in 
the interaction between expectations and consciousness: conscious awareness seems 
crucial for the implementation of top-down expectations, but not for the generation 
of bottom-up stimulus-evoked prediction errors. These results constrain and update 
influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.
21
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Introduction
A rapidly growing body of work indicates that sensory processing is strongly influenced 
by expectations that we have about likely states of the world. Such expectations are 
shaped by the context in which we are operating, but also by learning, past experience 
and our genetic makeup [3,8,9]. Expectations are typically thought to originate 
from higher-level brain regions, such as the (pre)frontal cortex, which may guide 
information processing in lower-level sensory regions via top-down projections. In 
this framework, what we consciously see is proposed to be strongly influenced by 
the brain’s expectations about, or its best guess of, the outside world [30,39,40]. 
Initial studies support the idea that the brain uses information in the environment 
to build expectations of stimulus frequency or conditional probabilities to modify 
perceptual processing [5,6]. These ideas have been formalized in theoretical models, 
such as predictive coding and sequential sampling models [2,3,41]. Although these 
frameworks are attractive in their simplicity, how exactly expectations shape conscious 
perception, and to what extent awareness guides the formation of expectations, is still 
largely unknown.
At present, there are (at least) three issues that need to be resolved to further our 
understanding of the relationship between expectations and consciousness. The first 
issue relates to the effect that expectations may have on conscious awareness itself. It 
has been shown that valid expectations increase the speed of conscious access [28,42–
44] and may help selecting or facilitating stimulus interpretation when (visual) input is 
ambiguous or noisy [15,29,39,45,46]. It is yet an open question whether expectations 
can boost an otherwise unseen stimulus into conscious awareness, thereby enabling 
the switch from a nonconscious to a conscious stimulus representation, instead of 
merely facilitating its cognitive interpretation or its speed of appearance in time.
Second, it is an open question to what extent prediction errors, arising in a situation 
of invalid expectations, can be registered outside of conscious awareness. It has been 
shown that “oddball” stimuli (e.g. simple violations in auditory tone sequences) elicit 
early mismatch responses in electrophysiological signals: the mismatch negativity 
(MMN) [47,48]. Interestingly, MMN’s can even be observed when attention is distracted 
from the tone sequences [10] or in several reduced states of consciousness, such as 
sleep [49], anesthesia [50] and vegetative state [10]. This suggests that the MMN 
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reflects a pre-attentive nonconscious prediction error signal [11,51,52]. However, 
it remains debated whether these signals originate in model-based comparisons of 
expectations to new input or merely reflect passive low-level sensory adaptation to 
repeated inputs [12,53]. The one study in which these mechanisms were dissociated 
in a nonconscious state showed adaptation remains operative during sleep, whereas 
prediction error detection disappears [13], questioning the notion that prediction 
errors may be registered nonconsciously.
The final issue concerns the role of awareness in implementing expectations. Many 
expectation-based models assume that expectations are implemented via top-
down neural activation. Interestingly, influential theories of consciousness suggest 
that conscious access requires similar top-down interactions between higher-level 
(e.g. prefrontal) and lower-level (e.g. visual) brain regions, referred to as feedback 
or recurrent processing [16,23]. Information that does not reach conscious access is 
thought to only trigger feedforward activity or local recurrent interactions between 
posterior brain regions. Therefore, it is unclear how nonconscious information, in 
the absence of feedback signals from higher-order cortical areas, could lead to the 
implementation of expectations.
Methods
Participants
We tested 26 participants in Experiment 1 (21 females, age 19.5±1.3 years), 34 
participants in Experiment 2 (27 females, age 20.0±1.1 years) and 85 participants in 
Experiment 3 (63 females, age 22.0±3.2 years). All participants were right-handed and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
For all experiments, participants for whom the minimum number of observations in 
one or more conditions was lower than 10, were excluded from analysis. Additionally, 
for Experiment 2 (EEG), we had to exclude 2 participants due to problems with the 
reference electrodes. In the end, this resulted in the inclusion of 25 participants for 
Experiment 1 (20 females, age 19.5±1.3 years), 29 participants for Experiment 2 (22 
females, age 20.0±1.1 years) and 67 participants for Experiment 3 (49 females, age 
21.9±3.0 years).
The studies were approved by the local ethics committee of the University of 
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Amsterdam and written informed consent was obtained from all participants according 
to the Declaration of Helsinki. Compensation was 20 Euros for Experiment 1, 30 euros 
for Experiment 2 and 25 Euros for Experiment 3, or equivalents in course credit.
Materials
All stimuli were generated using the Psychophysics Toolbox [54] within a MATLAB 
environment (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). Stimuli were displayed on an ASUS 
LCD monitor (1920 x 1080 pixels, 120Hz, 50.9x28.6 cm screen size, 46.3pixels/°) on a 
“black” (RGB: [0 0 0], ±3cd/m2) background while participants were seated in a dimly 
lit room, approximately 70 cm away from the screen.
Procedure and Stimuli
Participants performed an attentional blink (AB) task [20], in which on every trial a 
rapid series of visual stimuli was presented consisting of a sequence of 17 uppercase 
letters drawn from the alphabet but excluding the letters I, L, O, Q, U, and V. Every 
letter appeared maximally once per trial. Letters were presented at fixation in a mono-
spaced font (font size: 40; corresponding to a height of approximately 1.2°) for 92 ms 
each.
Experiment 1
Participants were instructed to detect target letters within the rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP). The first target (T1: G or H) was always presented at the fifth 
position of the RSVP. On most trials (80%) it was followed by a second target (T2: D or 
K) at lag 2, lag 4 or lag 10 (respectively 183, 367 or 917 ms later). Each lag was equally 
likely. T1 was presented in green (RGB: [0 255 0]), while T2 and the distractor letters 
were white (RGB: [255 255 255], ±320cd/m2).
Crucially, there was a predictive relationship between the two targets (Figure 2.1A). 
Namely, in the 80% of trials where a T2 was presented, the identity of T1 (e.g. G) 
predicted which T2 was likely (75%, e.g. D) or unlikely (25%, e.g. K) to appear. On 
the 20% remaining trials without a T2 a random distractor letter was presented at 
the T2-timepoint (every distractor letter was presented maximally once per trial) The 
mapping of T1 and T2 was counterbalanced over participants, so that for half of the 
participants the most likely target combinations were G-D and H-K while for the other 
half G-K and H-D were most likely. To be able to distinguish different lags in the absence 
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of a T2 stimulus, 4 grey squares (RGB: [200 200 200], ±188cd/m2; size: 0.35°; midpoint 
of each square centered at 1.30° from fixation) were always presented around the 
stimulus (T2 or distractor) at the T2-timepoint. Participants were instructed to use the 
timing information this cue provided when making decisions about the presence of a 
T2 (only the letters “D” or “K”, all other letters where distractors).
Following a 150 ms blank period at the end of the RSVP, participants gave their 
responses. First, they indicated whether or not they had seen any T2 by pressing the 
left or right shift key on the keyboard. The mapping between the keys and the response 
options was randomized per trial to decouple participants’ responses from the decision 
they had to make. Then they were asked to make a forced choice judgment about the 
T2 letter (D or K) that was presented by typing in this letter. Finally, they made a similar 
response about the identity of T1 (G or H). We used long response timeout durations 
of 5s and participants were instructed to value accuracy over response speed. The 
inter-trial interval, as defined by the time between the last response and the onset of 
the stream, was 500-750 ms.
The experiment consisted of two one-hour sessions on separate days within one week. 
In the first session, participants received instructions about the task and subsequently 
performed the task for 6 blocks of 75 trials (total 300 trials). The goal of the training 
session was to familiarize participants with the task. Besides, since we did not instruct 
participants about the predictive relationship between T1 and T2, some practice on 
the task was required for them to (implicitly) learn this relationship. In the second 
session, participants first received a summary of the instructions, after which the actual 
experiment started. Participants performed 6 blocks of 90 trials (total of 540 trials) of 
the AB task. The first three participants performed 6 blocks of 105 trials (630 trials). 
In both sessions participants received summary feedback about their performance at 
the end of each block, followed by a short break.
Experiment 2 (EEG)
The task in the EEG experiment was the same as in Experiment 1, except that in 
Experiment 2, we only asked participant to give one response by typing in the target 
letters they observed. In addition, we only used two different lags: lag 3 (275 ms; 2/3rd 
of trials) and lag 10 (917 ms; 1/3rd of trials). To further increase the number of trials, 
the ITI range was reduced to 200-400 ms.
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Again, the experiment consisted of two different sessions within one week. The first 
session (1 hour) consisted of instructions followed by extensive training (720 trials over 
6 blocks) on the task. Participants were not explicitly informed about the predictive 
relationship between the targets. In the second session (2 hours) we first prepared 
the participant for the EEG measurements and gave brief instructions about the task. 
Then, participants performed 12 blocks of 120 trials (total 1440 trials) of the AB task.
Experiment 3
To investigate the importance of T1 detection for expectation effects on conscious 
access, we adjusted the task we used in Experiment 1 to decrease the visibility of T1 
(Figure 2.3A). We now presented T1 in white instead of green, to make it stand out less 
among the other stimuli. Furthermore, T1 duration was staircased per participant such 
that participants could report T1 on roughly 75% of the trials. Starting in the second 
half of the training and continuing in the experimental session, after each block T1 
duration was decreased by one frame (8 ms) if performance was higher than 85% and 
increased by one frame if performance was lower than 65%. To ensure T1 duration 
would not deviate too much from the duration of other stimuli, T1 duration was only 
allowed to be in the range of 42-142 ms (max. 50 ms different from other stimuli). The 
median duration of T1 in the second session was 125 ms. On 20% of trials no T1 was 
presented and a random distractor letter was presented instead. When both targets 
were present, T1 predicted which T2 was likely to follow with 75% accuracy.
We made a few changes to the task design to increase the efficiency of the design. The 
ITI was reduced to values between 300-500 ms. In addition, we only asked participants 
for one response. They were asked to type in any target letter they had seen during 
the trial and refrain from typing in a T1 and/or T2 letter when they did not see any. The 
response was confirmed by pressing the space bar on the keyboard or when a timeout 
of 4s had passed. To further increase the number of trials per condition, we decided 
to use only lag 3 (2/3rd of trials) and lag 10 (1/3rd of trials). Because T1 duration was 
staircased on an individual basis, the T1-T2 SOA differed between participants. On 
average, lag 3 corresponded to an SOA of 308 ms while lag 10 corresponded to an SOA 
of 950 ms.
Finally, we manipulated the instructions we gave to participants in order to see to what 
extent explicit knowledge of the relationship between T1 and T2 affected our results. 
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As in Experiment 1, we tested participants during two separate sessions within one 
week. The first group of the participants (N=25) did not receive any explicit instruction 
about this relationship, similar to Experiment 1. The second group of participants 
(N=19) received explicit instructions about the T1-T2 relationship at the start of the 
second session, and a third group of participants (N=23) received those instructions 
already at the start of their first session.
The first session (1 hour) was used for instructions and training the participants on the 
task (10 x 75 trials). The experimental session in which participants performed the AB 
task lasted 1.5 hour and contained 16 blocks of 75 trials (1200 trials).
Behavioral analyses
Preparatory steps were done with in-house MATLAB scripts. Statistical analyses 
(repeated measures ANOVAs and paired t-tests) were performed using JASP software 
[55]. In situations where a specifically tested hypothesis did not yield a significant 
result, we used a Bayesian equivalent of the same test to quantify the evidence for 
the null-hypothesis [56,57]. In those cases, using JASP’s default Cauchy prior, Bayes 
Factors (BF) were computed for each effect. To increase the interpretability in analyses 
with multiple factors, we used Bayesian model averaging to get a single BF for each 
effect in ANOVA’s. This BF is the change from prior to posterior inclusion odds, and 
can intuitively be understood as the amount of evidence the data gives for including 
an experimental factor in a model of the data. The BF will either converge to zero 
when the factor should not be included, or to infinity when it should be included in 
the model. Values close to one indicate that there is not enough evidence for either 
conclusion. We use the conventions from Jeffreys [58] to interpret the effect sizes of 
our Bayesian analyses.
Experiment 1
In our behavioral analyses we looked at the T2 detection performance, given that 
T1 was correctly identified. A response was considered to be correct when (1) 
the participant indicated no T2 was present when no T2 was presented or (2) the 
participant correctly indicated a T2 was present and subsequently reported the correct 
target letter. Since expectation is only a meaningful concept when a T2 target was 
presented, the T2 absent trials, on which a distractor letter was presented instead of 
a T2, were not taken into consideration for the main statistical analyses. Trials where 
27
Chapter 2  •  Dynamic interactions between top-down expectations and conscious awareness
one of the responses was missing were deleted from all analyses. Percentage correct 
was used in a 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with the factors lag (lag 2, lag 4, lag 
10) and expectation (valid, invalid). In a control analysis, we repeated our analyses for 
Experiment 1 based on the T2 detection responses (ignoring the accuracy of the T2 
identification) as dependent variable (see also Results). Since the seen/miss response 
is orthogonal to the specific expectations about target letters, this analysis rules out 
simple response biases as a potential cause of our effects.
Experiment 2 (EEG)
The behavioral analyses for the EEG experiment were similar to those for Experiment 
1. However, the factor lag had only 2 levels (lag 3, lag 10). Percentage correct T2 
detection was computed as in Experiment 1 using only the trials on which T1 was 
correctly reported. A response was considered to be correct when the letter a 
participant entered was the letter that was presented or when a participant refrained 
from entering a letter when none was presented for the T2 absent trials. In addition, 
we computed a T2 detection measure to use in a control analysis: if a participant typed 
in any letter, we categorize the response as a “target seen” response, otherwise we call 
it a “target absent” response. This outcome measure was used in a control analysis.
Experiment 3
In this experiment, participants gave only one response by typing in the target they had 
perceived. Trials on which no response was given or on which an impossible response 
was given (e.g. two T1 targets reported) were excluded from analyses. For T1 and T2 
separately, we assessed the accuracy of the responses. The definition of correct and 
incorrect responses was the same as in Experiment 2 and we also used the same T2 
detection measure.
Subsequently, T2 percentage correct detection was used in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 mixed 
ANOVA with the within-subject factors lag (lag 3, lag 10), expectation (valid, invalid) 
and T1 visibility (T1 seen, T1 missed) and the between-subject factor instruction 
(none, start session 2, start session 1). As mentioned before, this between-subject 
factor was included to find out whether predictive effects would be modulated by 
explicit knowledge of the relation between T1 and T2. To investigate the effect of T1 
visibility in more detail, we followed up the main analyses by other mixed ANOVAs 
in which we first split up the dataset based on T1 visibility. In situations where we 
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found interactions with the factor instruction, we compared the effects of lag and 
expectation separately per instruction condition using repeated measures ANOVAs 
and paired-samples t-tests.
Finally, to test for an interaction between expectation validity and lag, we combined 
behavioral data from all experiments in a post-hoc analysis. Only trials on which T1 was 
correctly identified were used. For Experiment 1 we averaged data for lag 2 and lag 
4 to create an average “short lag” condition. Subsequently, these data were entered 
into a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA with the within-subject factors lag (short, long) and 
expectation (valid, invalid) and the between-subject factor experiment (Experiment 1, 
Experiment 2, Experiment 3).
Electroencephalographic Measurements
EEG was recorded with a BioSemi ActiveTwo system and sampled at 512 Hz (BioSemi, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Potentials were measured from sixty-four scalp 
electrodes, along with two reference electrodes on the earlobes and four electrodes 
measuring horizontal and vertical eye movements. After data acquisition, EEG data 
was pre-processed with the FieldTrip toolbox for MATLAB [59]. First, data were re-
referenced to the linked earlobes, high-pass filtered at 0.01 Hz, and epoched from 
-0.750 to 1s surrounding the onset of T2. Data were visually inspected and trials and/
or channels containing artifacts not related to eye blinks were manually removed, 
resulting in deletion of on average 9.1% (±3.9%) of trials and 2.0 (±1.7) channels. 
Independent component analysis was used to identify components related to eye 
blinks or other artifacts that could easily be distinguished from other EEG signals. After 
the independent component analysis, previously deleted channels were reconstructed 
based on a nearest neighbor approach. Trials were baseline corrected to the average 
amplitude prior to T1 onset (-0.750 to -0.275 relative to T2). As a final step, we applied 
a 40Hz low-pass filter to the trial data, after which ERPs were created separately for 
each condition of interest.
Electroencephalographic analyses
All EEG analyses are based exclusively on trials where T2 appeared at lag 3 and T1 was 
correctly identified. We used a combination of Fieldtrip [59] and in-house MATLAB 
scripts to perform our analyses. As a first step, we performed cluster-based permutation 
tests [60] on the time-window 0-750 ms from stimulus onset to isolate significant ERP 
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events relating to expectation validity (valid, invalid; irrespective of T2 visibility) or 
T2 visibility (seen, missed; irrespective of validity) or the interaction between these 
factors. Next, we used an in-house built MATLAB script to isolate the significant events 
as clusters in time and space. For this purpose, we computed an average difference 
wave over all channels that were part of the cluster at any point in time. Subsequently, 
the onset and offset of a cluster were defined as the time period around the maximum 
difference where the difference did not drop below 50% of this maximum and where 
at least one channel showed a significant effect. We then selected the 10 channels that 
showed the largest effect in this time-window. One of the observed events reflected a 
mixture of the traditionally observed P3a and P3b components [61,62]. Therefore, we 
split the event into two clusters by manually selecting either the 32 most anterior or 
32 most posterior EEG channels (from the central midline) before running the cluster 
selection procedure.
As an alternative way to establish potential interactions between T2 detection and 
validity, we inspected the clusters that were isolated in the previous step in more 
detail. This may be a more powerful (but also less sensitive) way to detect small 
effects, because data is averaged over more time-points and channels. Within each 
of the clusters, we performed a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA (and its Bayesian 
equivalent, see also Behavioral Analysis) with the factors T2 detection (seen, missed) 
and expectation validity (valid, invalid) on the cluster data averaged over channels 
and time. To prevent double dipping, in each analysis we only considered the effects 
orthogonal to the one that was used to define the cluster (e.g. not testing the effect of 
expectation in a cluster defined based on the expectation effect).
Results
Experiment 1: (how) do expectations affect conscious access?
In the first experiment we addressed the question if expectations about the likelihood 
of stimulus identity modulate the likelihood of conscious access, and if so, in what 
direction. To do so, we used the attentional blink paradigm [20]. The attentional blink 
is an impairment in the conscious perception of the second of two target stimuli that 
are presented in rapid succession when the initial target was correctly perceived. Here 
we modified the paradigm in such a way that the first target (T1: the letter G or H, in 
green) predicted which of the second targets would most be likely to appear in case 
a T2 target was presented (T2: the letter D or K, predicted=75%, unpredicted=25%, 
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A. Task Design: Exp 1 & 2 (EEG)
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In Figure 2.1 we plot the percentage of trials in which T2 was correctly detected and 
T1 discrimination was also correct (average T1 accuracy was 94.20%, sd=5.77%) for 
the three different lags (lag 2, 4 and 10). T2 was considered to be detected correctly 
when participants indicated to have seen it (based on the first response) and correctly 
in white, Figure 2.1A). On 20% of trials we presented a random distractor letter 
instead of a T2 target. At the end of each stream of letters, participants gave three 
responses. First, they indicated whether or not they had seen any of the two T2 
targets (“seen”/“unseen” response). Second, they were prompted to make a forced-
choice judgment about the identity of T2 (whether the letter D or K was presented). 
Third, participants had to make a similar forced-choice decision about the identity of 
T1 (whether the letter G or H was presented) (see Methods for details). Participants 
were not explicitly instructed about the predictive relationship between T1 and T2.
Figure 2.1: Task design and behavioral results of Experiment 1 and 2. (A) The trial structure of the 
attentional blink task used in Experiment 1 and 2. Each trial consisted of a stream of rapidly presented 
letters in which predefined target letters had to be detected and then reported at the end of the stream. 
The first target (T1: a green G or H) always appeared at the fifth position. The second target (T2: D or K), 
was presented at varying SOAs (lags) after the first one and was marked by placeholders. The identity of 
T1 predicted which of the T2 targets was most likely to appear, thereby introducing validly and invalidly 
predicted T2 targets. On 20% of the trials no second target was presented and a random distractor 
letter was presented instead. (B) Percentage correct T2 target detection at each of the T1-T2 lags, for 
valid expectations, invalid expectations and T2 absent trials in Experiment 1. Validly predicted T2’s were 
significantly more often perceived than invalidly predicted T2’s. (C) Percentage of T2 target detection at 
each of the T1-T2 lags, after a valid or invalid expectation or on a T2 absent trial for Experiment 2. Again, 
validly predicted T2’s were more often perceived, in particular at short lags. Error bars represent SEM.
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identified it (based on the second response). Overall, there was a clear attentional 
blink, as reflected by reduced T2 detection when the time (i.e. lag) between T1 and 
T2 was shorter (Figure 2.1B, main effect of lag: F2,48=48.15, p<0.001). Importantly, 
expectations modulated T2 detection rate. T2 detection was significantly better 
when T1 validly predicted T2 (black lines) compared to when the expectation was 
invalid (gray lines, main effect of validity: F1,24=7.10, p=0.014, no significant interaction 
between lag and validity: F2,48=1.30, p=0.283). These results extend several previous 
studies [28,29,42,43,63] by showing that conscious perception is (partly) determined 
by the transitional probability of the input the brain receives.
While these data support the notion that valid expectations trigger access to 
consciousness, it has been recognized that such findings may not solely be due to 
changes in perception, but perhaps (also) due to changes in decision criteria or 
response biases [64–66]. To rule out the possibility that our effects could be explained 
by a response bias in which people simply report the target letter that they expected 
based on T1, irrespective of whether they consciously perceived T2, we performed 
an analysis with T2 detection (instead of T2 discrimination, see Methods) as the 
dependent variable. This analysis takes into account only participants’ first response 
(the “seen”/“unseen” response), regardless of whether subsequent T2 letter 
identification was correct or not. Crucially, this analysis cannot be influenced by any 
decision/response biases because the response was orthogonal to the participants’ 
expectation. Information about the most likely letter to appear cannot predispose 
participants to better determine whether a target letter was presented at all. Still, we 
observed a qualitatively similar pattern of results (main effect of validity: F1,24=5.47, 
p=0.028). This finding suggests that validity indeed boosted participants conscious 
access of T2, instead of merely eliciting a shift in response bias.
Experiment 2: EEG markers of conscious and nonconscious expectation violations
Subsequently, we tested whether expectation violations can be elicited by 
nonconsciously processed unpredicted stimuli or whether conscious perception of a 
stimulus is a prerequisite for it to trigger neural expectation error responses. To test 
this, we measured subjects’ brain activity with EEG while they performed a similar task 
as in Experiment 1. First, we replicated the behavioral effects of Experiment 1 (Figure 
2.1C). Overall, T1 performance was high (M=93.61%, sd=7.31%) and T2 detection was 
higher at lag 10 than at lag 3 (main effect of lag: F1,28=128.72, p<0.001), reflecting a 
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robust attentional blink. More importantly, validly predicted T2s were discriminated 
better than invalidly predicted T2s (main effect of validity: F1,28=9.49, p=0.005). The 
effects were similar in a control analysis where we considered the percentage of T2 
seen responses (regardless of the exact letter participants entered), making it less 
likely that our effect can be explained by a response bias (main effect of validity: 
F1,28=4.23, p=0.049). In this experiment, the validity effect was significantly modulated 
by lag (validity x lag: F1,28=5.86, p=0.022), an effect that was numerically similar, but not 
significant in Experiment 1. Participants performed better for valid than invalid trials 
at lag 3, but there was no convincing evidence for an effect of expectations at lag 10 
(lag 3 validity effect: t28=3.40, p=0.002; lag 10 validity effect: t28=0.98, p=0.334). Thus, 
expectation effects were larger at the time at which T2 more often goes unperceived. 
A. Difference topographies (Invalid - Valid)
uV0
1
-1
0 - 62.5 62.5 - 125 125 - 187.5 187.5 - 250 250 - 312.5 312.5 - 375
375 - 437.5 437.5 - 500 500 - 562.5 562.5 - 625 625 - 687.5 687.5 - 750
B. Early central negativity
Valid
Invalid
A
m
pl
itu
de
 (µ
V)
5
0
-5
time (ms)
0 250 500 750
av
g 
am
pl
itu
de
 (µ
V) 3
1
0
2
Seen Miss
C.
Next, we investigated potential differences in the neural processing of predicted and 
unpredicted stimuli, as a function of stimulus awareness. To this end, we contrasted 
invalidly and validly predicted T2s and tested this difference using cluster-based 
Figure 2.2: ERP effects related to T2 prediction validity. (A) Topographic maps of the difference between 
validly and invalidly predicted T2s over time (0 = T2 onset). Cluster-based permutation tests were used 
to isolate the significant events, while correcting for multiple comparisons across time and (electrode) 
space. On each head map, channels with a significant effect for at least 50% of its time window are 
highlighted. (B) The average ERP time-course of the 10 channels shown on the headmap on the left, 
shown separately for each validity condition. The significant time-window is marked by a black line above 
the x-axis. Invalidly predicted T2s were associated with greater fronto-central negativity than validly 
predicted T2s. (C) Bar graphs showing the average amplitude of the four conditions (visibility x prediction) 
for the significant neural event shown in B. In all plots error bars represent SEM.
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permutation testing, correcting for multiple comparisons across both time (0-750 ms) 
and (electrode) space (see Figure 2.2 and Methods) [60]. We found one significant 
difference over fronto-central electrode channels, which reflected greater T2-
elicited negativity for invalid compared to valid trials between 174-314 ms (p=0.015, 
Figure 2.2B), therefore potentially reflecting some type of mismatch response. 
We then further analyzed this event to test whether the difference was modulated 
by, or dependent on, conscious perception of T2. Crucially, the size of this fronto-
central mismatch component was independent of T2 awareness (F1,28=0.04, p=0.850, 
BF=0.254, Figure 2.2C), indicating that both seen and unseen T2’s generated a fronto-
central mismatch response.
Additionally, analyses of T2 visibility effects (irrespective of expectation validity) 
replicated previously reported findings [61,67,68]. In these analyses, we examined the 
difference in ERPs following seen and missed T2s using a cluster-based permutation 
test (Figure 2.3), revealing two significant events. First, a significant negative difference 
could be observed over (left) posterior electrodes from 170-355 ms after T2 onset 
(p=0.010; Figure 2.3A). This event was followed by a significant long-lasting positive 
event (p<0.001), reflecting a mixture of the P3a and P3b components, extending over 
frontal and central electrodes.
Subsequently, we had a closer look at the interactions between conscious access and 
expectation validity. Therefore, we analyzed the ERP events that were isolated in the 
previous step in more detail (Figure 2.3B-G). For this analysis we first isolated the 
traditionally observed AB-related P3a and P3b ERP components from the long-lasting 
positive ERP event that differentiated between seen and missed T2s [61]. Doing so 
resulted in an early positive P3a cluster (Figure 2.3D) over fronto-central channels 
that was significant between 395-586 ms and a somewhat later positive P3b cluster 
(Figure 2.3F) over more posterior parietal channels, which was significant between 
445-611 ms. Within each of these clusters we performed repeated measures ANOVAs 
with the factors validity and T2 detection.
For none of the events we found evidence that the T2 detection effect was  modulated 
by expectation validity (early left-posterior event: F1,28=0.29, p=0.597, BF=.260;  P3a: 
F1,28=1.56, p=0.222, BF=0.230; P3b: F1,28=2.10, p=0.159, BF=0.296), though the BF 
values suggest that the evidence for the absence of such interactions is moderate 
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at best. This is somewhat surprising, because especially the late positive events 
have previously been related to conscious access [61,69] and metacognition [70].
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Figure 2.3: ERP effects related to T2 visibility analyses. (A) Topographic maps showing the difference 
between seen and missed T2s over time (0 = T2 onset). Cluster-based permutation tests were used to 
isolate the significant events while correcting for multiple comparisons across time and (electrode) space. 
On each head map, channels showing a significant difference for at least 50% of its time window are 
highlighted. Three events were isolated based on the permutation tests. (B,D,F) For each of the events 
individually, the average ERP time-course of the 10 channels shown on the headmap on the left, separately 
for T2 seen and T2 missed conditions is shown. The significant time-window is marked by a black line 
above the x-axis. (C,E,G) Bar graphs showing the average amplitude of the four conditions (visibility x 
prediction) for the significant neural events shown in (B,D,F). In all plots error bars represent SEM.
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However, recent investigations show it may also reflect even later more cognitive 
processes, merely arising as a consequence of becoming consciously aware of 
information [71,72]. We did not find evidence that the amplitude of these ERP events 
was modulated by expectation validity, which may suggest that once a stimulus has 
been perceived consciously, it is irrelevant whether or not the expectation was valid.
Finally, we directly tested for an interaction between conscious access and expectation 
by comparing the validity ERP effect (invalid-valid) for T2 seen and T2 missed trials 
in a cluster-based permutation test (this analysis takes into account the entire scalp 
topography). Again, no significant interactions between these factors were observed 
(all clusters p>0.10).
Experiment 3: the role of conscious awareness in implementing top-down 
expectations
In our final experiment, we addressed the question whether expectation formation 
itself can unfold in the absence of awareness and subsequently influence conscious 
access (Figure 2.4). To address this question, we changed the color of T1 from green to 
white and for each subject staircased T1 duration in such a way that T1 was correctly 
identified on approximately 75% of the trials (actual T1 identification performance: 
M=76.03%; sd=8.65%). T1 duration did not differ between trials where T2 was seen 
and trials where T2 was missed (T2 detection: t66=0.31, p=0.752; T2 seen: M=117.42 
ms; T2 missed: M=117.46 ms), which indicates that T1 visibility was not determined 
by stimulus duration. Likely, internal fluctuations in the system (e.g. variability in 
attention) must be causing participants to sometimes see T1 and sometimes miss 
it. Moreover, on 20% of trials no T1 was presented (but replaced by a distractor). 
Further, to test to what extent explicit knowledge of the predictive relationships 
between stimuli would increase the validity effects, we varied the moment at which 
explicit information about the predictive relations between T1 and T2 was provided. 
The experiment consisted of a training session and a test session on separate days. A 
first group of subjects received no explicit instructions about the predictive relations 
in either session and had to learn them implicitly through experience with the task; 
the second group received explicit instructions about the T1-T2 relations in the test 
session only, but not in the first training session; and the third group received explicit 
instructions already from the start of the experiment.
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T1 visibility strongly affected T2 detection. When T1 was seen, T2 detection was 
markedly lower than when T1 was missed (main effect of T1 awareness: F1,64=4.62, 
p=0.035), in particular at short lags (T1 awareness x lag: F1,64=72.95, p<0.001). Validly 
predicted targets were detected more often (main effect of validity: F1,64=33.39, 
p<0.001). The effect of expectation validity on T2 detection varied as a function of 
T1 awareness and instructions (T1 awareness x validity: F1,64=40.55, p<0.001; validity 
x instruction: F1,64=5.91, p=0.004; T1 awareness x validity x instruction: F2,64=11.33, 
p<0.001). When T1 was seen (Figure 2.4B), a clear attentional blink was observed 
(main effect of lag: F1,64=170.01, p<0.001) and validly predicted targets were more 
often detected than invalidly predicted targets (main effect of validity: F1,64=64.97, 
p<0.001) (as in Experiment 1 and 2). Like in the previous experiments, a control 
analysis considering only the percentage of T2 seen responses (regardless of the exact 
letter participants entered) also revealed a significant effect of validity (main effect of 
validity: F1,64=65.83, p<0.001), making it unlikely that response biases are causing the 
effect. Interestingly, we also observed a significant attentional blink for missed T1’s, 
reflecting a nonconsciously elicited AB (main effect of lag: F1,64=74.42, p<0.001). This AB 
effect cannot be explained by an overall T2 detection performance benefit for targets 
that are presented later in the trial because the AB was larger for trials on which T1 
was presented but missed compared to trials on which no T1 was presented in the trial 
(lag x T1 presence: F1,66=24.19, p<0.001). However, although missed T1’s triggered an 
AB, expectation validity did not affect T2 detection performance for missed T1’s (main 
effect of validity: F1,64=0.35, p=0.554), regardless of the type of instruction participants 
received about the predictive relation between T1 and T2 (validity x instruction: 
F2,64=0.64, p=0.533). A Bayesian equivalent of the repeated-measures analysis strongly 
suggested validity should not be included in a model of the data (BF=0.084).
The above results highlight that only when T1 was seen, valid expectations facilitated 
T2 detection. A post-hoc analysis on T1-seen trials only revealed that this effect was 
modulated by how explicitly we instructed participants about the predictive relationship 
between T1 and T2 (validity x instruction: F2,64=14.83, p<0.001). The validity effect, as 
defined by the difference between valid and invalid trials, averaged across the two 
lags, increased with more explicit instructions (group 1: 1.87%, group 2: 19.53%, 
group 3: 26.27%). These results indicate that, not only does the visibility of T1 define 
the predictive impact on T2 detection, but also the extent to which these predictive 
relations are (explicitly) known affects the impact of expectations on conscious access. 
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Finally, in contrast to Experiment 2, on T1 seen trials the validity effect was independent 
of lag (validity x lag: F1,64=1.750, p=0.191). Since we anticipated stronger expectation 
effects at short lags, behavioral data from all three experiments was combined in a 
post-hoc analysis. Only trials on which T1 was correctly identified were used and for 
Experiment 1 we averaged data for lag 2 and lag 4 to create an average “short lag” 
condition. A significant interaction between validity and lag showed that across all 
experiments, the expectation effect was stronger at short lags compared to the long 
lags (validity x lag: F1,118=5.73, p=0.018; no validity x lag x experiment interaction: 
F2,118=0.065, p=0.937).
This may also explain why the validity effect appeared more pronounced in Experiment 
3 compared to Experiments 1 and 2, because in Experiment 1 and 2 subjects were not 
explicitly instructed about the predictive relations between T1 and T2. 
Figure 2.4: Task design and behavioral results of Experiment 3. (A) Trial structure of the task used in 
Experiment 3. T1 visibility was staircased at approximately 75% correct by manipulating its duration (on 
20% of trials no T1 was presented). (B) Percentage of correct T2 target detection at each of the T1-T2 lags, 
after a valid or invalid expectation and on a T2 absent trials, for trials where T1 was correctly reported 
(T1 seen). As in Experiment 1 and 2, when T1 was seen, va’lidly predicted T2’s were more often detected 
than invalidly predicted T2’s. (C) Solid lines show percentage of T2 target detection at each of the T1-T2 
lags, after a valid or invalid expectation and on a T2 absent trials, for trials where T1 was presented but 
missed. In contrast to T1 seen trials (B), when T1 was not seen, validity did not enhance T2 detection. 
However, a missed T1 still triggered a significant attentional blink, as compared to trials on which no T1 
was presented (dotted line). Error bars represent SEM.
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Discussion
In this report we investigated three important questions regarding the intricate 
relationship between top-down expectations and conscious awareness. The first 
question that we addressed was how prior information about the identity of an upcoming 
stimulus influences the likelihood of that stimulus entering conscious awareness. 
Using a novel attentional blink paradigm in which the identity of T1 cued the likelihood 
of the identity of T2, we showed that stimuli that confirm our expectation have a 
higher likelihood of gaining access to conscious awareness than stimuli that violate our 
expectations, especially at short lags. The expectation effect was qualitatively similar 
across all three experiments, regardless of subtle experimental differences in task 
design and overall performance between those experiments. Furthermore, it could 
not be explained by simple shifts in response criterion, because it was also present 
for a dependent measure orthogonal to the expectation manipulation. Together, this 
suggests that valid expectations amplify the perceptual strength of a stimulus and 
therefore increase the chance of conscious access, possibly due to the sharpening of 
its neural representations [6]. This interpretation is supported by previous experiments 
that have shown varying effects of expectations on (subjective) perception, such as 
studies showing prior knowledge increases the speed [29,42–44] and accuracy [28] 
of stimulus detection. Furthermore, our findings complement recent studies showing 
that the AB can be reduced when there is knowledge about temporal statistics of the 
task [73,74] or when the latency of T2 targets is explicitly cued [75,76]. In addition, 
two recent reports have shown that, in some subjects, expecting the presentation of 
a stimulus can even elicit an illusory stimulus percept when no stimulus is presented, 
when attention is diverted [77,78]. Future experimentation is required to shed light on 
the generalizability of our effect to simpler tasks. Such experiments may also consider 
using other measures of subjective perception (e.g. perceptual awareness scale) [79].
The second question that we addressed was related to the extent to which nonconscious 
stimuli can trigger prediction error responses, as measured with EEG. Over the last 
20 years, we and others have shown that nonconscious information processing is 
rather sophisticated [19,80], and that a diverse range of high-level cognitive processes 
can unfold nonconsciously [81–88]. Interestingly, in Experiment 2 we found that 
expectations that are violated by a nonconscious stimulus trigger a stronger negative 
fronto-central ERP component than expectations that are confirmed. This neural 
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event was similar for trials on which T2 was seen and on trials where T2 was missed, 
highlighting that conscious awareness of a stimulus is not a prerequisite for it to trigger 
a prediction error response [89,90]. This effect may reflect a mismatch signal, similar to 
the mismatch negativity [48], which is a negative deflection following oddball stimuli 
that develops 100-200 milliseconds after stimulus onset. Sometimes this effect lasts 
longer, in some experiments until ~400 milliseconds, depending on the specifics of the 
task and stimulus material [11,47,52]. While in terms of interpretation this effect is 
similar to a mismatch effect, its topography is slightly different than a typical visually 
evoked MMN, which generally peaks more posteriorly, although considerable variation 
in its topography has been reported [47]. Alternatively, it is possible that the higher 
activation for valid compared to invalid trials corresponds to the frontal selection 
positivity (FSP), which is a well-known marker of non-spatial attentional processes 
[91]. In our paradigm, this could be explained as improved attentional selection when 
expectations are confirmed. Although the exact nature of the observed component 
deserves future experimentation, the key finding is that the effect was independent 
of T2 perception and purely depends on the validity of the expectation. This is in 
line with studies that have shown context influences on nonconscious information 
processing [92–95], studies that have shown that the MMN can be observed when the 
expectation violations are unattended [10,11,52,96,97] and more generally evidence 
for relatively high-level processing of nonconscious stimuli [72,80,98]. Nevertheless, 
the absence of interactions in the ERP is also somewhat surprising (but see also Rutiku 
et al. [99]), because as noted earlier such interactions between expectation validity 
and conscious T2 detection were present in behavior. A neural basis for this effect 
should exist, but may be very subtle. Recently, a study by Aru et al. [45] found early 
(<100 ms) differences in signal amplitude over posterior channels that predicted the 
behavioral benefit of prior knowledge on the detection of stimuli presented at the 
threshold of perception. Another potentially interesting signature to investigate could 
be the onset of components related to conscious perception [42] and how they relate 
to expectations. Moreover, it is possible that instead of signal strength, it is the signal-
to-noise ratio or sharpness of the representation that is improved [6]. Possibly, valid 
expectations do not modulate the amplitude of the neural response, but increase the 
specificity of the neural representation.
In the final experiment, we showed that conscious perception of T1, initiating the 
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expectation, is a prerequisite for influences on conscious access to occur. On the 
subset of trials where subjects did not see T1, there was no expectation effect of T1 on 
T2 detection performance. This result contrasts with findings from a recent study that 
suggested that some priors may operate nonconsciously [100]. Chang and colleagues 
presented participants with masked grey-scale natural scene images and found that 
the nonconscious processing of these images improved subsequent recognition of 
their degraded counterparts, so-called “Mooney images”, presented seconds later. 
One explanation for this difference is that the priors on which the effects of Chang 
et al. relied may be more automatic and hard-wired than the relatively arbitrary 
relationships that people have to learn and actively use in our experiments. It is 
possible that lower-level, automatic expectations are more easily processed outside 
of awareness compared to the more active ones studied here.
Further, it is also possible that with more training we would find nonconscious 
expectation effects. However, since subjects were already trained on the task on a 
separate day before performing the experimental session, this possibility seems 
unlikely. We did observe greater validity effects when subjects were made explicitly 
aware of the predictive nature of T1, suggesting that explicit knowledge of stimulus 
associations can facilitate the effects of stimulus-induced expectations. Finally, it 
should be noted that we did not test the full range of timing intervals between T1 
and T2. It has been shown and proposed that the processing of nonconscious stimuli 
is relatively fleeting [23,101,102], so it is conceivable that the T1-T2 lags that we have 
used here may have been too long to observe expectation effects triggered by unseen 
T1’s. Further, a significant attentional blink was observed on trials on which T1 was 
missed, indicating that attention was still captured by a missed T1 at the T1-T2 lags 
used here. This latter result is in line with evidence showing that nonconscious stimuli 
are able to trigger attentional capture [103–105] and with a study showing lower T2 
detection for T1’s that were missed compared to trials without a T1 (in that experiment 
this effect was independent of lag [106]). 
In summary, three main conclusions can be drawn from the present series of studies. 
First, expectation confirmation, compared to violation, increases the likelihood of 
conscious awareness, suggesting that valid expectations amplify the perceptual 
strength of a stimulus. Second, nonconscious violations of conscious expectations are 
registered in the human brain Third, however, expectations need to be implemented 
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consciously to subsequently modulate conscious access. These results suggest a 
differential role of conscious awareness in the hierarchy of predictive processing, 
in which the active implementation of top-down expectations requires conscious 
awareness, whereas a conscious expectation and a nonconscious stimulus can interact 
to generate prediction errors. How these nonconscious prediction errors are used 
for updating future behavior and shaping trial-by-trial learning is a matter for future 
experimentation.

3
Exploring the effect of 
expectations and stimulus 
relevance on stimulus-specific 
neural representations and 
conscious report
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Abstract
Subjective experience can be influenced by top-down factors, such as expectations 
and stimulus relevance. Recently, it has been shown that expectations can enhance 
the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported, but the neural mechanisms 
supporting this enhancement are still unclear. We manipulated stimulus expectations 
within the attentional blink (AB) paradigm using letters, and combined visual 
psychophysics with magnetoencephalographical (MEG) recordings to investigate 
whether prior expectations may enhance conscious access by sharpening stimulus-
specific neural representations. We further explored how stimulus-specific neural 
activity patterns are affected by the factors expectation, stimulus relevance and 
conscious report. First, we show that valid expectations about the identity of an 
upcoming stimulus increases the likelihood that it is consciously reported. Second, 
using a series of multivariate decoding analyses, we show that the identity of letters 
presented in and out of the attentional blink can be reliably decoded from MEG data. 
Third, we show that early sensory stimulus-specific neural representations are similar 
for reported and missed target letters in the AB task (active report required) and an 
oddball task in which letter was clearly presented but it’s identity was task-irrelevant. 
However, later sustained and stable stimulus-specific representations were uniquely 
observed when target letters were consciously reported (decision-dependent signal). 
Fourth, we show that global pre-stimulus neural activity biases perceptual decisions 
for a “seen” response. Fifth and last, no evidence was obtained for the sharpening 
of sensory representations by top-down expectations. We discuss these findings in 
light of emerging models of perception and conscious report highlighting the role of 
expectations and stimulus relevance.
45
Chapter 3  •  Effect of expectations and relevance on neural representations and  report
Introduction
What we perceive can be strongly influenced by top-down factors, such as our prior 
expectations about likely states of the world and the relevance of input for the task at 
hand [2,3,5,15]. According to a growing body of work, expectations, originating from 
past experience, can shape perception on both a neural and behavioral level [8]. When 
sensory input matches prior expectations, performance on tasks is higher [28,107] 
and neural activity is attenuated [6,108,109]. In such predictive brain frameworks, it 
is assumed that what we perceive consciously is strongly related to the brain’s best 
guess about the current state of the outside world [30,39,40,110]. 
Indeed, the idea that our subjective experience is strongly influenced by top-down 
factors is supported by numerous behavioral studies that have shown beneficial 
effects of prior knowledge on subjective perception, such as on the accuracy [28] 
or speed [29,43] of detecting a stimulus. Likewise, it has been shown that prior 
knowledge increases the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported during the 
attentional blink [74,75,111]. Although expectations seem to affect conscious access, 
the neural underpinnings of these expectation-related modulations are still unclear. 
In a recent electroencephalographic (EEG) study, we did not find evidence that the 
amplitude of neural signals, as indexed by event-related potentials (ERPs), explained 
the effect of expectations on the likelihood of conscious report of the stimulus [111]. 
This finding may be explained by the fact that instead of modulating the strength of 
neural responses, expectations may improve the signal-to-noise ratio or “sharpness” 
of the representation of stimuli [6,112] by instantiating specific perceptual templates 
(e.g. orientation selectivity), even before stimulus presentation [113]. Because it 
has been shown previously that conscious perception may also be closely linked to 
the quality or variability of sensory representations [114,115], we here investigated 
whether similar enhancements of neural representations also underlie the effects that 
expectations have on the conscious accessibility of stimuli [111]. 
To this end, we used an attentional blink (AB) task in which each trial consisted of a 
sequence of rapidly presented letters in which one or two targets were to be detected 
and reported at the end of the stream (targets were marked by placeholders; Figure 
3.1). Crucially, the first target stimulus (T1) could either validly, invalidly or not predict 
(neutral trials) the identity of the second target (T2). Then, multivariate decoding 
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analyses were used on magnetoencephalography (MEG) data to track the neural 
representations of target stimuli. Further, to explore the effects of task-relevance 
on stimulus-specific neural activity patterns subjects also performed an additional 
“oddball” task in which a similar rapid serial presentations of letters was presented 
but subjects were instructed to merely detect a contrast change of a stimulus that 
happened only on 10% of the trials (these oddball trials were not taken into account 
in the analyses). The combination of both tasks allowed us to trace the sensory 
processing of a letter stimulus in the absence of a target identity decision (because 
the identity of the letters was task-irrelevant). This decoding profile could then be 
compared to the decoding profile that we observed during the attentional blink 
(AB) task in which subjects did have to make a perceptual decision on the presented 
target stimuli (target identity was task-relevant). This approach allowed us to perform 
within-task decoding analyses (training and testing on the AB task using k-folding) and 
between-task decoding analyses (training on the oddball task and testing on the AB 
task). Both approaches are aimed at testing different hypotheses. Training the classifier 
on the oddball task will extract a relatively pure sensory signal (letter identity is task-
irrelevant) and therefore between-task decoding will isolate those neural processes in 
the AB task related to sensory stages of information processing that may be associated 
with the effect of expectation on conscious report. On the other hand, within-task 
decoding in the AB will train and test on task-relevant stimuli that require a categorical 
decision and therefore may reveal decision-dependent processes that may underlie 
the role of expectation in conscious access. Thus, our approach allowed us to examine 
if expectations influence visual representations at sensory and/or decision-related 
stages and how this influences conscious access.
Methods
Participants
We tested a total of 33 participants for this experiment. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. One participant was excluded because T1 identification 
performance was more than three standard deviations lower than the group average. 
Furthermore, four participants were excluded because their subjective estimates 
of T2 visibility were unreliable. Their indication that the perceived a target did not 
correspond to above chance performance in identifying the same target (p>0.05 in 
a binomial test). Additionally, only in the MEG analyses we excluded participants for 
whom the number of observations in any of the relevant conditions was lower than 
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Materials
Stimuli were generated using the Psychophysics Toolbox [54] in a MATLAB (MathWorks, 
10, similar to Meijs et al [111]. As a result, we included 28 participants (18 females, 
age 22.5±2.8 years) in the behavioral analyses and 19 participants (12 females, age 
23.0±2.8 years) in the MEG analyses.
The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee of the Radboud University 
(CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen; “Imaging Human Cognition”). Written informed consent was 
obtained from participants according to the Declaration of Helsinki. Compensation 
was either 36 Euros or course credit.
Figure 3.1: Experimental tasks. (A) The trial structure of the AB task. Each trial consisted of a sequence 
of rapidly presented letters in which targets were to be detected and reported at the end of the stream. 
Targets were marked by placeholders. The first target (T1: G, H or V) was always the fifth stimulus in the 
sequence. A second target (T2: D or K) was presented on 80% of trials, at varying lags. In a training session 
participants learned conditional probabilities between T1 and T2. One T1 stimulus was used as neutral 
condition and was thus followed equally often by each T2 stimulus. The other T1 stimuli predicted which 
T2 target was most likely to appear, thereby introducing valid and invalid expectations. (B) The oddball 
task was designed such that temporally it resembled the AB task as much as possible, with the most 
notable difference that on every trial three target stimuli were presented (T1, T2 at lag 3 and T2 at lag 10). 
Participants’ task was unrelated to the target identity: they had to respond to oddball stimuli that were 
present on 10% of trials at one of the target positions. In the example trial here, an oddball is presented 
at the T2 time point.
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Natick, MA, USA) environment. In the behavioral lab, stimuli were displayed 
on a 24” BENQ LED monitor (1920 x 1080 pixels; 120 Hz). A chinrest was used to 
control participants’ distance from the screen (±57 cm). In the MEG environment, a 
PROPixx projector (VPixx Technologies Inc., Saint-Bruno, Canada) located outside the 
magnetically shielded room projected the stimuli onto a screen approximately 80 cm 
in front of participants (1920 x 1080 pixels, 120 Hz). All visual input was presented 
on a “black” background (luminance: ±3 cd/m2) and matched for visual luminance 
between the two labs.
Procedure and stimuli
The experiment consisted of two sessions that were completed within one week. 
The task of interest was a version of the attentional blink (AB) task [20], which 
participants performed in the second session while MEG was recorded. In the first 
session, participants performed an oddball task while MEG recordings were made and 
subsequently practiced the AB task outside of the MEG environment.
AB task
Participants had to detect targets within a sequence of rapidly presented distractors 
(92 ms per stimulus). Each stimulus in the sequence was an uppercase letter that was 
presented at fixation in a monospaced font (“Courier New”; letter size: ±2.08°). The first 
target (T1: G, H or V) was presented in “green” at the fifth position of the sequence. In 
80 % of trials a second target (T2: D or K) was presented as well, either at lag 3 (275 ms 
after T1 onset; 2/3rd of trials) or at lag 10 (917 ms after T1 onset; 1/3rd of trials). Each 
distractor letter (all alphabet letters excluding the targets) was presented maximally 
once per trial. T2 targets and distractors were presented in “white” (luminance: ±230 
cd/m2).
Crucially, the likelihood of each T2 target appearing was conditional on the identity 
of the T1 stimulus that was previously presented (Figure 3.1A). For every participant, 
one of the T1 stimuli (e.g., G) predicted that “D” was the most likely T2 target while 
another T1 (e.g., H) made the exact opposite prediction that “K” was the most likely 
T2 target. If a T2 was presented, the likely T2 stimulus was shown on 75 % of trials. A 
third T1 stimulus (e.g., V) had no predictive value (neutral condition; 20 % of trials), 
i.e., both T2 stimuli were equally likely to follow T1. All possible mappings of T1 and T2 
were used across participants in a counterbalanced fashion, but mappings were fixed 
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within a given participant for the entire experiment. On 20 % of trials no T2 stimulus 
was presented but a random distractor letter was presented instead at either lag 3 
or lag 10. Both at the T1-timepoint and the T2-timepoint of a trial, even when a T2 
target was omitted, a placeholder consisting of 4 grey squares (luminance: ±50 cd/m2; 
size: 0.62°; midpoint of each square centered at 2.34° horizontally and vertically from 
fixation) was presented around the target letter. This placeholder provided timing 
information, cueing participants which time points were relevant in a trial and thereby 
helping them decide which targets they saw during a trial.
Following a 150 ms blank period at the end of the letter sequence, participants gave 
their responses with the use of a (MEG-compatible) button-box, using the index, 
middle and ring finger of their right hand. First, they reported the T2 they had seen 
(3 response options: D, K or none). Subsequently they were asked to make a forced 
choice judgment about the T1 stimulus that was presented (3 response options: G, H 
or V). A long response timeout duration of 4 second was used and participants were 
explicitly instructed to value accuracy over response speed. The inter-trial interval was 
800 - 1200ms.
Before starting the MEG recordings, participants were briefly reminded about the task 
instructions (given to them in a previous session, see next paragraph). Every participant 
completed approximately 750 trials (average: 748.7±26.8, minimum: 652; maximum: 
803), with the exact number depending on the duration of MEG preparations and 
the number of breaks a participant needed. At the end of every block of 75 trials, 
participants received summary feedback about their performance and were provided 
with the opportunity to take a short break.
Behavioral training
At the end of the first session, every participant was behaviorally trained on the AB 
task. First, participants received on-screen instructions in which they were explicitly 
instructed about the predictive relationship between T1 and T2. Subsequently, they 
performed 6 blocks of 75 trials (total 300 trials) of the task. The goal of this training 
session was to familiarize participant with the task before the MEG session and to 
teach participants the predictive relationship between T1 and T2. We did not analyze 
the data from this training session.
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Oddball task
At the start of the first session, we measured MEG while participants performed an 
oddball task that was highly similar to the AB task (Figure 3.1B). Again, every trial 
consisted of a sequence of letters in which letters that were targets in the AB task were 
presented. On every trial, a “T1” (the letter D, V, or G) was presented followed by a 
“T2” (the letter D or K) at both lag 3 and lag 10 and every of these targets was marked 
by placeholders. All stimuli, including targets, were “white”. Every combination of 
“T1” and “T2” stimuli was equally likely, meaning there was no predictive relationship 
between the targets. Importantly, participants were not made aware of the presence 
of the targets. Moreover, because they had not yet seen the AB task, they did not know 
about the existence of any specific target letters (or predictive relationship between 
those). The timing of the stimuli and trials was identical to that in the AB task, with 
the exception that at the end of the letter sequence the ITI (800 – 1200 ms) started 
immediately.
Participants were instructed to detect oddball stimuli that occurred on 10 % of the 
trials. An oddball was defined by its grey (luminance: ±78 cd/m2) instead of white 
color. Once an oddball was detected, the participant had to press the index finger 
button on an MEG-compatible button box as quickly as possible while the task 
continued. Because, unbeknownst to participants, oddballs were always either a “T1” 
or “T2” target, they were accompanied by the same placeholders used in the AB task. 
To make sure participants would focus their attention on the relevant time points in 
the sequence, they were explicitly instructed that these squares marked the potential 
temporal positions of oddballs and would help them detect oddballs. Oddball trials 
were excluded from all analyses. Every participant completed 8 blocks of 96 trials 
(total 768 trials) of the task. Every block was followed by summary feedback and a 
short break.
Behavioral analyses: AB task
Behavioral data was preprocessed with in-house MATLAB scripts and subsequently 
analyzed using JASP software [55]. We focused on the effects of lag and expectation 
on percentage correct T2 visibility, given that the correct T1 target was reported. T2 
responses were considered to be correct if a participant entered the target letter that 
was presented or reported not seeing a letter when none was presented on a T2 absent 
trials. Since expectations are undefined on T2 absent trials, these trials cannot be used 
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in the main statistical analyses. T2 percentage correct was used in a 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with the factors expectation validity (valid, invalid, neutral) and lag 
(lag 3, lag 10). Subsequently, we performed post-hoc t-tests to directly compare the 
different levels of expectations within each of the lags.
MEG measurements and preprocessing
Whole-head magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recordings were acquired (sampling 
rate 1200 Hz) using a 275-channel MEG system with axial gradiometers (VSM/CTF 
Systems, Coquitlam, BC, Canada), which was located in a magnetically shielded room. 
Four channels (MLC11, MLC32, MLF62, MRF66) were disabled in all participants for 
technical reasons. Head position was monitored and corrected if required using three 
coils, placed on the nasion and on earplugs in both ears [116]. Importantly, at the 
start of the second MEG session an effort was made to reposition a participants’ 
head as much as possible in the same location as during the first session by using a 
template head position saved in the first MEG session. In addition to the MEG, three 
sets of electrodes (+ground) were used to measure the electrocardiogram (ECG) and 
horizontal and vertical eye-movements (EOG). Finally, an Eyelink 1000 eyetracker (SR 
Research, Ottawa, Canada; sampling rate 1000 Hz) was used to measure pupil dilation 
and vertical and horizontal eye-movements.
For each session separately, we preprocessed the data with the FieldTrip toolbox for 
MATLAB [59]. Data were high-pass filtered at 0.01 Hz to remove slow signal drifts. 
Additionally, a set of notch filters was applied at 50, 100 and 150 Hz to remove line 
noise. Subsequently, we cut the data into epochs from -750 to 1500 ms relative to 
T1 stimulus onset. The data were visually inspected and trials and/or channels with 
artifacts were deleted (averages session 1: 7.0 % of trials, 1.2 channels; averages 
session 2: 5.4 % of trials, 1.1 channels). To remove noise originating from far away 
external sources, 3rd order gradient correction using the CTF reference sensors was 
applied. Independent component analysis was used to identify and remove data 
components related to eye blinks, eye movements or heartbeats. To get a reliable 
estimate of which components to delete, each of the components was correlated to 
the EEG and eyetracker channels. Following the independent component analysis, 
previously deleted channels were reconstructed using the average of neighboring 
channels. Finally, all trials were baseline corrected on the interval 500 ms prior to T1 
onset (corresponding to -775 to -275 ms prior to T2 onset).
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Decoding analyses and statistics
Prior to the decoding analyses, we applied a sliding window of 50 ms to the data, 
thereby smoothing the data in the temporal domain and improving the signal-to-noise 
ratio. Subsequently, we performed the decoding analyses by using linear discriminant 
analysis (LDA) decoders with the activity from all MEG-channels as features. In short, as 
outcome measure, the LDA decoder calculates the distance from a decision boundary 
on a trial-by-trial basis (full analysis details are available in [117]). This distance 
measure can be used as a quantitative measure of the evidence for a certain class in 
de decoder. In cases where a decoder was trained and tested on the same dataset, a 
10-fold cross-validation procedure was implemented in which for each fold the LDA 
decoder was trained on 90% of the trials and tested on the remaining 10% of trials.
To be able to look at the stability of neural representations over time, all decoders 
were trained at one time point and then tested on all time points, resulting in a 
temporal generalization matrix (time range -250 to 1500 ms relative to T1; see also 
[118]). Cluster-based permutation tests with 1000 permutations were used to find the 
significant positive or negative clusters within the temporal generalization matrices of 
interest [60].
Using these analyses methods, we initially decoded T2 target identity at lag 3 within 
each of the two tasks. Further decoding analyses were done between-tasks, training 
the LDA decoder on one task and testing it on the other task. For the main analyses, 
we used the decoding that was trained on the oddball task and tested it on the AB task 
data (only trials where T1 was correctly identified), separately for valid and invalid trials. 
We did not include the neutral condition here because the number of observation in 
this condition was low (only presented on 20% of trials). A similar analysis was done to 
compare T2 identity decoding between T2 reported and T2 missed trials. As a control, 
we repeated all these decoding analyses for T2 targets presented at lag 10, the results 
of which are reported in the Supplementary material.
Next, we used the decoder trained on the oddball task and tested it on the attentional 
blink data (T1 correct trials) for T2-absent trials and trials with lag 10 together (in 
both conditions, no target stimulus was presented at lag 3). Instead of grouping trials 
based on T2 identity, we grouped trials based on the expected T2 stimulus so that we 
could investigate the neural representation of sensory expectations. In a final group 
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of analyses, decoders were trained and tested on the AB task (lag 3 & T1 correct trials 
only), allowing us to investigate the main effects of expectation validity and T2 visibility 
within the AB task. In addition, we did within-task T2 decoding analyses separately for 
T2 reported and T2 miss trials. Finally, to get a better view at the decoding results 
when training and testing on the same time point, we extracted the diagonal from the 
temporal generalization matrices of a number of analyses. We performed a paired-
samples t-tests to each time-point of the data after T1 presentation (0 – 1500ms) and 
subsequently applied false discovery rate (FDR) correction.
Results
Behavioral results: Expectations increase the likelihood a stimulus being consciously 
perceived
In Figure 3.2A, we show percentage correct T2 discrimination for trials on which T1 
was correctly identified, separately for short and long lags (T1 accuracy T2 at lag 3: 
95.63%, sd=3.68%; T1 accuracy T2 at lag 10: 95.69%, sd=3.95%). We observed a clear 
attentional blink, as indicated by a reduced performance when the time between 
T1 and T2 was short compared to long (lag 3: 34.57%; lag 10: 62.58%; F1,27=61.43, 
p<0.001). Importantly, T2 stimuli were more often correctly reported when they were 
expected (collapsed across lag: expected: 59.44%, unexpected: 39.13%; F2,54=17.37, 
p<0.001) and this effect of expectations was different at lag 3 than at lag 10 (interaction 
lag x validity: F2,54=5.97, p=0.005). 
To test whether valid expectations increase, or invalid expectations decrease, T2 
reportability, we directly compared valid, invalid and neutral trials at each of the two 
lags. At lag 3, where T2 most often goes unreported, T2 discrimination performance 
was higher in the valid (black line; 47.67%) than in the neutral (dark grey line; 30.35%) 
and invalid (light grey line; 25.68%) conditions (valid-invalid: t27=5.49, p<0.001; 
valid-neutral: t27=4.60, p<0.001). In the invalid condition performance was lowest, 
although not significantly lower than performance in the neutral condition (neutral-
invalid: t27=1.79, p=0.084). At the long lag, performance was also higher in the valid 
than invalid condition (valid 71.21%; invalid 52.57%; valid-invalid: t27=3.88, p<.001) 
and performance in the neutral condition was in in between (neutral: 63.97%; valid-
neutral: t27=2.04, p=0.051; neutral-invalid: t27=3.18, p=0.004). Taken together, these 
results replicate earlier findings that conscious access can be affected by expectations 
about stimulus likelihood and that these effects are largest at short lags, inside the 
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Figure 3.2: Behavioral results. (A) Percentage correct T2 (given that T1 was correctly identified) for each 
of the lags and conditions. Expectation validity significantly modulated the percentage of T2s that was 
consciously seen and this effect was different at the two lags. At lag 3, the expectation effect was mainly 
driven by the valid condition, while at lag 10 both invalid and valid expectations affected T2 detection as 
compared to neutral trials. (B) Results from a control analysis, using the percentage of trials on which 
participants reported seeing a T2 target (given that T1 was correctly identified) as dependent variable. 
Overall, the pattern of results was similar to that in (A). Error bars denote SEM. (C) A general overview of 
the response pattern over all trials for both lags together. The percentage of misses (no target reported 
when one was presented) was high in all participants. When no target was presented, participants usually 
correctly reported not seeing one. (D) The response pattern shows participants had a response bias: if 
they reported a target on an T2-absent trial, they more often guessed the expected target letter (when 
there was an expectation). Panels (E) and (F) depict the relationship between the response bias (% of 
T2-absent trials with a predictive T1 where the expected target was reported) and the behavioral effect 
of expectation validity (valid-invalid) at lag 3 (E) and lag 10 (F). In both, the relationship is shown for both 
outcome measures that were used to quantify behavioral performance: percentage correct (black) and 
percentage of “T2 seen” responses (regardless of the exact letter participants entered; grey).
55
Chapter 3  •  Effect of expectations and relevance on neural representations and  report
AB [111]. Additionally, at this short lag performance was significantly improved 
when expectations were valid compared to neutral, while the negative effect of 
invalid expectations was relatively small. Indeed, the benefit of valid expectations 
was larger at lag 3 than at lag 10 (valid-neutral lag 3 vs. valid-neutral lag 10: t27=3.67, 
p=0.001). This suggests that at short lags, when the stimulus is most often missed, the 
expectation effect we observe is most likely mainly driven by a higher likelihood of 
conscious access for valid expectations.
Overall, false-alarms were infrequent, on ~19% of T2-absent trials subjects reported 
a target (Figure 3.2CD), correct rejections for T2-absent trials: lag 3: 81.52%; lag 10: 
79.94%) [77]. Further, if participants reported seeing a target on T2-absent trials, 
they most often reported the expected target (t27=2.52, p=0.018), demonstrating that 
participants had indeed learned the predictive relationship between T1 and T2 and 
used this information for their decisions. Therefore, it may be that the behavioral 
effect of expectations we observed on T2-present trials is (partly) affected by this 
response bias. Indeed, a correlation between participants’ response bias, as measured 
by the percentage of trials they reported the expected letter vs. another letter on 
T2-absent trials, and their expectation effect, as measured by the difference in 
performance on valid minus invalid trials, was observed (Figure 3.2EF, black dots; lag 
3: spearman r=0.49, p=0.008; lag 10: spearman r=0.34, p=0.078). However, a control 
analysis where we considered the percentage of “T2 seen” responses (classifying a 
response as “seen” regardless of whether this letter was correct) showed comparable 
effects of expectation (validity effect: F2,54=6.06, p=0.004; interaction lag x validity: 
F2,54=5.13, p=0.009, Figure 3.2B). Note that, in this analysis, the dependent variable 
(seen vs. miss) is orthogonal to participants’ expectations (D vs. K) and this outcome 
measure did not correlate with the response bias participants had on T2-absent trials 
(Figure 3.2EF; grey dots; lag 3: spearman r=-0.09, p=0.649; lag 10: spearman r=-0.11, 
p=0.594), which suggests that the observed expectation effects are present over and 
above the effects of response bias (note that the pattern of correlations was similar 
when the outlier subject with a response bias of nearly 100% was removed from the 
data, lag 3: spearman r=-0.05, p=0.822; lag 10: spearman r=-0.05, p=0.807).
Decoding of T2 identity is modulated by stimulus relevance
Multivariate analyses can provide insights in the dynamics of category-specific brain 
responses, as different neural and cognitive processes may be reflected in dissimilar 
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patterns of temporal generalization [118]. First, we tested the role of stimulus relevance 
in the processing of the letter stimuli. To do so, we focused on decoding the identity 
of T2 targets (D vs. K) at lag 3, irrespective of conscious report or expectations. Figure 
3.3AD shows the temporal generalization profiles for T2 identity within each of the 
two tasks, using cross-validation procedures and corrected for multiple comparisons 
(see Methods for details). As can be seen, T2 target identity could reliably be decoded 
from MEG data in both tasks, as reflected in a typically observed diagonal decoding 
pattern starting ~100 ms after T2 onset (Oddball task: p=0.022; AB task: p<0.001, 
permutation tests). This diagonal decoding pattern likely reflects a rapid sequence of 
distinct neural processes evolving over time [117–119]. 
Figure 3.3: Decoding of T2 identity at lag 3. Temporal generalization matrices showing that T2 target 
identity (D vs K) could be reliably decoded from MEG data within both the oddball task (A) and the AB 
task (D). Decoding was longer and more widespread in the latter, suggesting neural representations were 
more stable over time. (B,E) Between-task decoding analyses (trained and tested on separate datasets) 
showed significant clusters along the diagonal, indicating that early neural sensory representations of 
T2 identity were highly similar between tasks. Timing of all panels is relative to T1 onset. Dashed lines 
indicate T2 stimulus onset. Contours of significant clusters are marked with a grey line (corrected for 
multiple comparisons). Decoding of T2 targets at lag 10 is shown in Supplementary Figure 3.1. To visualize 
the pattern of activity used by the decoding algorithm, we display topographic plots (C,F) showing the 
planar gradient ERF-difference between the two T2 targets. On the left, we show the topography in an 
early window (100-250ms post T2; including the peak in decoding) for both tasks. For the AB task only, a 
topographic plot in a later window (450-600ms post T2), in which there was no significant decoding for 
the oddball task, is shown.
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Further, as expected, in the AB task only, decoding performance was not only strong 
on the diagonal of the temporal generalization matrix, but it’s profile showed a 
mixture of a diagonal and a square shaped pattern and decoding was much more 
extended in time. Thus, we observed stimulus-specific stable and sustained activation 
patterns for task-relevant compared to task-irrelevant stimuli. Next, we trained 
decoders on each of the tasks and subsequently tested them on the data of the other 
task (between-task decoding) to test for neural similarities and differences between 
the tasks. This approach solely resulted in significant clusters along the diagonal of 
the temporal generalization matrices for both analyses, further highlighting a shared 
neural coding of target identity from ~100 to 375 ms post T2 onset (Oddball task → 
AB task: p=0.013, Figure 3.3B; AB task → Oddball task: p=0.024, Figure 3.3E). This 
conclusion is also supported by similar decoding results for T2 stimuli presented at 
lag 10 (Supplementary Figure 3.1). Overall, these results show that when stimuli 
are task-relevant (require a perceptual decision) additional processing steps can be 
picked up by the classifier and T2 identity is processed in more stable and temporally 
extended neural representations, as compared to when stimuli are task-irrelevant 
[117,118,120–122].
Conscious access is related to late and stable stimulus-specific neural representations
Next, we tested how category-specific neural representations relate to conscious report, 
or the absence thereof, in the AB task. We did so by comparing T2 decoding (D vs. K) at 
lag 3 for seen T2s vs. missed T2s. To rule out any effect caused by the identity of T1, only 
trials where T1 was correctly reported were incorporated in these analyses. Figure 3.4 
shows both between-task analyses (Oddball task → AB task) and within-task analyses 
(AB task → AB task; done separately per condition). In line with prevalent theoretical 
models of consciousness, early sensory processing of the stimulus was independent 
of conscious report, as reflected by similar decoding profiles along the diagonal of the 
temporal generalization matrix for reported and missed T2’s (Figure 3.4A-C, Oddball 
task → AB task) [19,23,102,123]. Figure 3.4 also shows within-task analyses (AB task 
→AB task) in which T2 identity was decoded based on solely T2 reported (Figure 3.4D) 
or T2 missed trials (Figure 3.4E). In both analyses, significant diagonal decoding of 
T2 identity was observed (T2 reported trials: p<0.001, miss trials: p=0.042), however, 
when T2 was reported, this decoding pattern was stronger, longer-lasting (Figure 
3.4F) and had a broader spatial profile (more square-shaped instead of diagonal, T2 
reported: 100 ms to 1200 ms post T2-onset; T2 missed: 100 ms to 400 ms post T2-
58
Chapter 3  •  Effect of expectations and relevance on neural representations and report
A. T2 decoding: T2 reported B. T2 decoding: T2 Missed
G. Decoding overall T2 visibility
1.5
TR
A
IN
 (s
) 1.0
0
0.5
0 1.51.00.5
TR
A
IN
 (s
) 1.0
0
0.5
0 1.00.5
1.5
1.5
TR
A
IN
 (s
)
0 1.00.5
1.0
0
0.5
1.5
1.5
Oddball task → AB task Oddball task → AB task
AB task → AB task
0
0.5
-0.5
0
0.6
-0.6
0
0.6
-0.6
TEST (s) TEST (s)
TEST (s)
C. Diagonal of T2 decoding in A/B
Oddball task → AB task
F. Diagonal of T2 decoding in D/E
AB Task → AB task
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
D
ec
od
er
 o
ut
pu
t
Reported only
Missed only
0 1.51.00.5
Time (s)
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
D
ec
od
er
 o
ut
pu
t
T2 reported
T2 missed
D. T2 decoding: Reported only
TR
A
IN
 (s
) 1.0
0
0.5
0 1.00.5
1.5
1.5
AB task → AB task
0
0.5
-0.5
E. T2 decoding: Missed only
TR
A
IN
 (s
) 1.0
0
0.5
0 1.00.5
1.5
1.5
AB task → AB task
0
0.5
-0.5
TEST (s) TEST (s)
H. Diagonal of T2 visibility decoding
AB Task → AB task
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
D
ec
od
er
 o
ut
pu
t
T1 T2
T1 T2
T1 T2
0 1.51.00.5
Time (s)
0 1.51.00.5
Time (s)
Figure 3.4: Conscious stimulus detection and its neural representation. Temporal generalization 
matrices for the decoding of T2 identity at lag 3, trained on the oddball task, for trials where T2 was 
consciously perceived (A) and trials where it was missed (B). T2 targets could be reliable decoded in 
both conditions and no significant differences between both conditions was observed along the diagonal 
(C). Within condition decoding analyses trained on the AB task show T2 decoding was more long-lasting 
(F) and stable on trials where T2 was consciously perceived (D) compared to where it was missed (E). 
(G,H) A direct investigation of the effect of T2 visibility (seen vs miss, irrespective of stimulus identity) 
showed widespread significant decoding starting before stimulus onset, indicating an early and long-
lasting main effect of stimulus visibility. Timing of all panels is relative to T1 onset and in every panel only 
trials where T1 was correctly identified were used. Dashed lines indicate the onset of a T2 stimulus at lag 
3. Significant clusters in the temporal generalization matrices are contoured by a grey line (corrected for 
multiple comparisons). Significant time-periods along the diagonals (C,F,H) are marked by horizontal lines 
at the bottom of the panel. Solid lines indicate significant time periods for conditions while the difference 
between conditions is indicated by a dotted line (F).
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onset). This suggests that, compared to missed T2’s, the signal was broadcast higher 
up the cortical hierarchy (for similar results see [117]). Please note that the apparent 
pre-stimulus decoding in Figure 3.4F should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence 
for decoding of stimulus specific T2 activations before the stimulus is presented. This 
effect most likely relates to decoding of T1, which in the AB task was correlated to T2. 
Finally, we aimed to decode reported vs. missed T2’s in the AB task, irrespective 
of the specific stimulus that was presented (classifier labels: reported vs. missed, 
target letter is not relevant, Figure 3.4G, p<0.001). Several interesting aspects of 
the obtained temporal generalization profile can be noted. First, along the diagonal, 
decoding was significant already before T2 presentation (Figure 3.4H). Neural activity 
before stimulus presentation thus predicted later stimulus report, in line with recent 
reports highlighting pre-stimulus fluctuations in neural activity that correlate with 
stimulus visibility (e.g. [123-125]). This analysis only included T1-correct trials, this pre-
stimulus effect cannot easily be explained in terms of differences in T1-performance. 
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that T1-related processes affect the results here, 
since others have shown that T1 processing may be different between blink and no-
blink trials [127,128]. The second interesting aspect about this overall visibility effects 
was that the square shaped pattern was much stronger and clearer. This stimulus 
independent profile is likely related to an amplified P3-like component on T2 reported 
trials compared to T2 missed trials, which is picked up by the classifier algorithm (see 
Supplementary Figure 3.4 for ERF results) [61,111].
Valid expectations do not enhance early sensory representations of stimulus identity
In our final set of decoding analyses, we aimed to explore the link between neural 
recordings, expectations and conscious report. Behaviorally, we observed that valid 
expectations increased the chance that a stimulus was subsequently reported and 
to test whether this may relate to the sharpening of sensory representation of T2 
identity, decoding performance was compared between trials where participants had 
a valid (Figure 3.5A) or invalid (Figure 3.5B) expectation at lag 3 (only T1-correct trials 
were included). Importantly, only between-task analyses were performed in which 
the decoder was trained on the oddball task (no T1-T2 predictability) to prevent the 
decoding being biased by the predictive relationship between T1 and T2 in the first 
place, which is inherently present in our AB-task and difficult to circumvent. Training 
on the AB task would also incorporate undesirable factors (e.g. conscious access: valid 
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trials are reported more often than invalid trials) into the classifier training. No effect 
of prior knowledge on the sharpening of sensory representations was observed (T2 
identity decoding was similar for valid and invalid trials, Figure 3.5C). Because several 
studies have shown that the effects of expectation may interact with (or even depend 
on) attention [129,130] we aimed to rule out that the absence of expectation-related 
sharpening could be attributed to a lack of attention for targets presented at lag 3 
(i.e., during the “blink” period). However, similar results were obtained for stimuli 
presented at lag 10 and hence out of the blink period (Supplementary Figure 3.3).
The lack of any decoding difference between valid and invalid trials makes it unlikely 
that participants’ expectations induced neural “perceptual templates” in the current 
task design. On valid trials, when participants’ expectation about the upcoming T2 
Figure 3.5: Expectation validity. Temporal generalization matrices for the decoding of T2 identity at lag 
3 for valid trials (A) and invalid trials (B) separately. Only trials where T1 was correctly identified were 
used. Panel (C) shows that no significant differences (valid – invalid) between the two conditions were 
observed, indicating T2 identity could be decoded equally well on valid and invalid trials (significant time 
period indicated by horizontal lines at bottom of panels), thus suggesting early sensory representations 
were not affected by the validity of prior expectations. (D,E) It was not possible to decode participant’s 
T2 stimulus expectations based on a between-task decoder trained on the oddball task data and tested 
on the attentional blink data. Timing is relative to T1 onset, and the dashed lines indicate the onset of T2 
stimuli at lag 3. We did not find any evidence for the existence of neural stimulus templates.
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was equal to the T2 that was presented, a decoder trained to distinguish T2 identity 
in the oddball task should have been able to pick up the representation of the target 
(expectation) before target presentation (target and expectation matched). Similarly, 
on invalid trials one would have expected inverse decoding, because participant’s 
expectation was opposite to the T2 stimulus that was later presented (target and 
expectation mismatched; see for example Kok et al [113]). To fully rule out that we 
may have missed expectation-induced sharpening we performed a final analysis in 
which we grouped trials based on the expected T2 stimulus instead of the actually 
presented T2 stimulus. Only T2-absent and lag 10 trials were used, so no T2 stimulus 
was ever presented at lag 3 in order to prevent any contamination of the results by 
actual stimuli. But again we did not observe the instigation of expectation-related 
perceptual templates (all p>0.221, Figure 3.5DE).
Discussion
In this report, we investigated the relationship between expectations and conscious 
access and the role of stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations. 
Using an attentional blink (AB) paradigm in which the identity of T1 predicted the 
likelihood of the T2, we found that T2 stimuli confirming T1-induced expectations are 
more likely to be consciously reported than T2 stimuli that violate these expectations. 
This is in line with studies that have shown that the speed [29,43,44] or accuracy 
[28,111] of stimulus detection is strongly influenced by expectations. Interestingly, by 
including neutral expectation trials we showed that the effect of expectations was 
mainly driven by a performance benefit for valid expectations, at least in the AB interval 
(at short lags) (see also [43]). Thus, at the time that targets are often missed, conscious 
access becomes more likely when expectations are confirmed (valid) compared to 
when they were absent or invalidated (Figure 3.2A). 
We have also presented a series of multivariate decoding analyses, in which we first 
showed that it was possible to reliably decode the identity of a target letter from 
MEG data, both when the identity of this letter was task-irrelevant in an oddball task 
and when it was task-relevant and actively searched for in an AB task. Furthermore, 
the combination of both within- and between-task decoding analyses revealed that 
stimulus-specific neural representations underlying the early stages of information 
processing (on-diagonal generalization) were highly similar for both tasks and 
independent of stimulus relevance and the outcome of the perceptual decision 
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(whether T2’s were reported or missed in the AB task) [102,117]. Similar early 
decoding profiles were observed for 1) task-irrelevant letters in the oddball task, 2) 
task-relevant, but missed T2’s in the AB task, and 3) task-relevant and reported T2’s in 
the AB task. These results suggest that early stimulus-specific neural processing stages 
are not modulated by either attention to the stimulus dimension (stimulus relevance) 
nor conscious access to the target identity (report), in line with previous findings [123]. 
It further shows that the representation of target letter identity is not “broadcast” 
to higher levels of the cortical hierarchy when this feature is task-irrelevant [119]. 
Usually, it is assumed that compared to nonconscious perception, conscious report 
is related to widespread neural activity (up to frontal areas) and more stable neural 
representations [16,19,23,114]. Indeed we observed that within the AB task, when 
targets were task-relevant, attended and reported, T2 identity could be decoded for 
a longer time frames and was more stable, reflected in a square shaped decoding 
profile [102,117,119,131–133]. Additionally, we observed a nonspecific (regardless 
of T2 identity or expectations) difference between T2 reported and missed trials, 
of which the late sustained part presumably corresponds to previously observed P3 
modulations related to conscious report [61,67,111] and task-relevance [71,134]. We 
also observed that fluctuations in neural activity (or overall “brain state”) before T2 
presentation influenced whether or not the stimulus was later reported, as has been 
recently demonstrated by several others using at threshold or backward masking tasks 
[124–126,135–138]. These fluctuations may reflect differences in T1 processing [128].
Next, in order to explain the behavioral effects of expectations on conscious access, 
we looked at the neural representations of T2 identity conditioned on the validity 
of single-trial expectations. We hypothesized that the early neural representation 
of validly expected stimuli would be “sharpened”, and that this improvement in 
improved stimulus representation would relate to enhanced stimulus report [6,107]. 
However, we did not observe this effect. Moreover, no evidence for expectation-
induced pre-stimulus perceptual templates was observed, although these effects have 
been recently reported in a different task context [113]. One possible explanation for 
this discrepancy in findings is that it may take longer than 300ms to encode T1 and 
translate the T1-prediction into a sensory representation. Nevertheless, in our study, 
the influence of expectations on conscious report was not reflected in modulations of 
sensory representations prior to T2 presentation or at early stages in the processing 
hierarchy (for a similar conclusion in a different paradigm see also [139]). It could be 
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that expectations can influence perception at multiple levels of the cortical hierarchy, 
with different processes being affected depending on the type of target stimuli or 
expectations being involved. In our AB paradigm, participants learned conditional 
relationships between two letter stimuli. Consequently, the expectations in our task 
were most likely represented at a higher level of the cortical hierarchy (i.e., semantic) 
as compared to the rather low-level perceptual expectations in earlier studies [6,113]. 
As a consequence, the early sensory representation of the targets that we pick up 
based on the oddball task may not have been optimal for detecting expectation-based 
modulations of stimulus processing. Therefore, the “format” in which the expectations 
were represented may simply have been different (e.g. verbally or motor code) than 
that of the incoming visual information and hence interactive effects may not have 
been visible at the sensory level [139,140]. Future research would benefit from using 
tasks that can capture the full stimulus processing hierarchy involved in processing the 
relevant stimuli within the experimental task (sensory, semantic, decision). 
In line with a recent study [139], we did not find any reliable decoding effects that 
we could relate to the behavioral benefits of expectations, suggesting it may be quite 
subtle and hard to detect (see also [111]). One possible implementation of expectations 
would be a modulation of the onset of components related to conscious perception 
[42]. Other potentially interesting signatures are the power and/or phase of alpha 
oscillations because a number of studies have shown that low pre-stimulus alpha 
power is predictive of subsequent conscious stimulus perception [124–126,135,141–
143]. Furthermore, it has been shown that expectations lead to changes in pre-stimulus 
alpha in a way that predicts stimulus visibility [144]. Future studies are required to 
unravel the effect of expectations on conscious access in the frequency domain.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, we have shown that the 
neural representation of letters presented during rapid serial visual presentation can 
be reliably decoded from neural activity as measured by MEG. While early, sensory 
representations of letters could be decoded regardless of the behavioral state of the 
subject, later and more stable multivariate activity patterns were dependent on top-
down modulations by task relevance, attention and conscious report. Second, we have 
shown that valid expectations enhance the likelihood of visual target detection but 
we did not find evidence that this was due to increased “sharpness” of the relevant 
sensory representations.
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Supplementary Material
Decoding results for T2 stimuli presented at lag 10
T2 identity for targets presented at lag 10 could be reliably decoded (Supplementary 
Figure 3.1) from MEG data both within-task (Oddball task: p=0.011; AB task: p=0.025) 
and between-task (Oddball task → AB task: p=0.025; AB task → Oddball task: p=0.020). 
This further validates the conclusion that the initial representation of T2 targets was 
similar between the tasks.
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The representation of T2 stimuli presented at lag 10 was similar for detected and 
missed T2s (Supplementary Figure 3.2; all p>0.0785). We should note that we did find 
effects for this contrast at lag 3, but these were on the off diagonal starting quite late, 
making it likely they simply “fall outside” the time axis in the temporal generalization 
matrix.
Supplementary Figure 3.1: Decoding of T2 targets at lag 10. We show the temporal generalization 
matrices for the decoding of T2 identity with different types of decoding analyses. Timing of all panels 
is relative to T1 onset. The dotted lines indicate the onset of T2 stimulus at lag 10. On the left, we show 
the decoding performance for cross-validated decoders that were trained and tested within either the 
oddball task (A) or attentional blink (B) task. On the right, we show the results for decoding analyses 
where the decoder was trained and tested on separate datasets. In (C) the decoder was trained on the 
oddball task and tested on the AB task, while in (D) the AB task was used for training and the oddball 
task was used for testing. The identity of T2 could be decoded in all the analyses. Contours of significant 
clusters are marked with a grey line (corrected for multiple comparisons).
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In line with the analyses performed for T2s presented at lag 3, no significant differences 
were observed between trials on which the stimulus was validly or invalidly expected 
(Supplementary Figure 3.3; all p>0.582). These results show it is unlikely that the 
absence of an expectation validity effect at lag 3 was due to a lack of attention in early 
time-windows where attention “blinks” [129].
ERF Methods
In order to be able to make a more direct comparison with our earlier study [111], 
we replicated the ERP analyses of main effects by performing two of ERF analyses in 
which we look at the effects of expectation validity and T2 visibility. Only lag 3 trials on 
which subject identified the correct T1 stimulus were used. Prior to the ERF analyses, 
the data was low-pass filtered at 40 Hz.
Supplementary Figure 3.2: Effects of conscious stimulus detection on the neural representation of T2s 
at lag 10. Temporal generalization matrices for the decoding of T2 identity at lag 10 for trials where the 
T2 was consciously perceived (A) and trials in which it was missed (B). Only trials where T1 was correctly 
identified were used. The timing of all panels is relative to T1 onset. Dashed lines indicate the onset of a 
T2 stimulus at lag 10.
Supplementary Figure 3.3: Effects of expectation validity on the neural representation of T2s at lag 10. 
We show the temporal generalization matrices for the decoding of T2 identity at lag 10 for valid trials (A) 
and invalid trials (B) separately. Only trials where T1 was correctly identified were used. There were no 
significant differences (valid – invalid) between the two conditions. Timing of all panels is relative to T1 
onset. Dashed lines indicate the onset of a T2 stimulus at lag 10.
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For each of the conditions in a comparison, the data were transformed to planar 
gradients to allow averaging over participants. Because this transformation is sensitive 
to the number of trials in a condition, we repeated this step 100 times for each 
condition, matching the number of trials between conditions that would be compared 
(by taking a random selection of trials from the largest condition) and averaging over 
these repetitions. Subsequently, we used cluster-based permutation tests [60] on 
Supplementary Figure 3.4: ERF results. Topographic maps showing the difference between reported and 
missed T2s (A) and between valid and invalid expectations (B) over time (0 = T2 onset) using planar gradients. 
Cluster-based permutation tests were used to isolate significant events. On every head map, channels 
belonging to a cluster that show significant difference for at least 50% of the time window are highlighted.
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the time-window 750 ms after T2 onset to isolate significant ERF events relating to 
expectation validity (valid, invalid; irrespective of T2 visibility) or T2 visibility (seen, 
missed; irrespective of validity).
ERF Results
Supplementary Figure 3.4 shows the results of the ERF analyses. In line with previous 
results [61,111], conscious detection of a target was reflected in a long-lasting P3-like 
component (p<0.001). However, we did not find an ERF effect analogous to the early 
negative posterior effect in the EEG results. Additionally, the comparison of the ERF 
on valid and invalid trials did not yield any significant differences (all p>0.332). Future 
research is required to explain the discrepancies in results between these studies, 
that may result from differences in task design or general differences between EEG 
and MEG.

4
Cue predictability does 
not modulate bottom-up 
attentional capture
Adapted from: 
Cue predictability does not modulate bottom-up attentional capture. Royal Society Open Science, 5, 
180524.
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Abstract
Attention can be involuntarily captured by physically salient stimuli, a phenomenon 
known as bottom-up attention. Typically, these salient stimuli occur unpredictably 
in time and space. Therefore, in a series of three behavioral experiments, we 
investigated the extent to which such bottom-up attentional capture is a function of 
one’s prior expectations. In the context of an exogenous cueing task, we systematically 
manipulated participants’ spatial (Experiment 1) or temporal (Experiment 2 and 3) 
expectations about an uninformative cue, and examined the amount of attentional 
capture by the cue. We anticipated larger attentional capture for unexpected 
compared to expected cues. However, while we observed attentional capture, we did 
not find any evidence for a modulation of attentional capture by prior expectation. 
This suggests that bottom-up attentional capture does not appear modulated by the 
degree to which the cue is expected or surprising.
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Introduction
When performing tasks in our everyday lives, we constantly have to battle potential 
distraction by task-irrelevant inputs. Even when we want to stay focused on the task 
at hand, it can be difficult to ignore other, often more salient, stimuli that capture 
our attention. Historically, there has been considerable debate on whether attentional 
capture is purely stimulus-driven [145,146], or also depends on top-down goals [147]. 
More recently it has been suggested that recent trial history [148] and associations 
with reward [149,150] may also modulate attentional capture. This implies that the 
presence and amount of attentional capture may be a complex function of both 
stimulus and internal variables [151]. 
Stimulus expectation is another factor that may modulate bottom-up capture. One 
of the studies providing evidence for this was carried out by Folk and Remington 
[152]. In a spatial cueing paradigm, they manipulated the frequency of salient but 
uninformative (i.e., not predictive of the target) cues. Their results indicated that these 
cues captured attention only when they were unlikely, regardless of the top-down task 
set participants were using (but see [153] for an alternative interpretation). In another 
study the proportion of distractors was systematically varied over blocks [154]. The 
distractors interfered more with target processing when they were presented in a 
block with fewer distractors, suggesting they captured attention more when they were 
more surprising. Similarly, it has been observed that novel stimuli are most potent 
in capturing attention [155] and also most robustly modulate the neural response 
in a macaque’s V1 [156]. Taken together, these studies support the hypothesis that 
attentional capture by task-irrelevant stimuli may be modulated by perceptual 
expectations, and most notably by the violation of these expectations. This can be 
interpreted as evidence that surprising stimuli are more salient and therefore more 
attention-grabbing [157,158]. Additional evidence supporting this idea comes from 
studies on mismatch detection, in which it has been shown that unexpected deviant 
stimuli lead to larger mismatch responses in the EEG-signal and seem to subjectively 
“pop out” [159–161].
Besides influencing the amount of attentional capture by distracting stimuli, there is 
evidence that prior information about these cues can help participants to voluntarily 
diminish distraction [162,163]. For example, it has been shown that attentional capture 
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by unlikely distractors can be attenuated when the search task promotes suppressing 
features similar to those of the distractors stimuli [153]. Another study showed that it 
is easier to ignore regular sequences than irregular sequences [164]. Whether reducing 
the amount of distraction is caused by the inhibition of attentional capture, or by rapid 
disengagement at a later stage is still debated [148,165]. An electrophysiological study 
by Kiss and colleagues suggested that bottom-up capture can be inhibited, but that 
this only happens when task demands (i.e., timing) require it [166].
One interpretation of the empirical evidence above is that surprising stimuli are more 
salient and therefore more attention-grabbing [157,158]. Predictive coding theories 
have suggested that processing unexpected events requires more resources [6,8]. 
One may conceptualize bottom-up attention as a way of redistributing resources, 
for example towards processing unexpected events. This is in line with findings that 
bottom-up attention increases contrast sensitivity [167]. Nevertheless, many models 
based on predictive coding have actually suggested that regularity and predictability 
may attract attention. The idea behind this is that predictable inputs are more strongly 
weighted because they are more reliable. A number of studies have provided support 
for this idea [37], suggesting that regularities automatically attract attention (but see 
e.g. [168]).
It thus seems that the link between expectation and bottom-up attention is still 
far from clear [8,169]. Attention may be either drawn to surprising stimuli, or to 
regularly occurring ones. Therefore, we performed a series of three experiments 
using an exogenous cueing task [34], in which we explicitly looked at this relationship 
by manipulating participants’ expectations about an otherwise uninformative (i.e., 
unrelated to target) cue stimulus. Specifically, we investigated to which extent prior 
expectations about the cue modulated bottom-up attentional capture. Based on the 
evidence listed earlier, we anticipated that unexpected cue stimuli will attract more 
attention and therefore result in larger cue-target validity effects (i.e., performance 
difference between validly and invalidly cued trials), whereas expected cue stimuli are 
followed by strongly reduced or even absent validity effects. To preview, in contrast 
to this hypothesis, we observed attentional capture in all experiments, but no direct 
modulation by prior knowledge about the cue stimulus in any experiment.
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Experiment 1: Do spatial expectations affect bottom-up attention?
Methods
Participants
We tested 120 participants in Experiment 1. This number was based on power analysis 
for a between-subjects design with 40 participants per group, with 80% power to 
detect medium-sized effects. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. We excluded two participants whose task performance was markedly (more 
than 3 standard deviations) worse than that of other subjects. As a result, we included 
118 participants (87 females, age 22.7±5.0 years). The experiment was approved 
by the local ethics committee of the Radboud University (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen; 
2014/288 “Imaging Human Cognition”). Written informed consent was obtained from 
all participants according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
Stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox [54] within MATLAB 
(MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA), generated by a Dell T3500 Workstation and displayed 
on a 24” BENQ LED monitor (1920 x 1080 pixels; 60Hz; screen size 53.1cm x 29.9 cm). 
All presented stimuli were “black” (RGB: [0 0 0]; ±0.3 cd/m2) on a grey (RGB: [150 
150 150]; ±103.9 cd/m2) background. A chinrest was used to control the distance 
participants were seated from the monitor (±57 cm). Participants responded by means 
of two button boxes.
Procedure and stimuli
Participants performed an adjusted version of the exogenous cueing task ([34], Figure 
4.1A). First, a cue (2° circular outline) was presented for 50 ms either 5 degrees above 
or below fixation. After the cue, a target was presented centered on either same (valid 
trials) or the opposite (invalid trials) screen location. Cue location and target location 
were unrelated, meaning that both target locations were equally likely throughout 
the experiment, regardless of where the cue was presented. Targets were small (0.48° 
wide and 0.60° high) arrows pointing either leftward or rightward. The participants’ 
task was to report the direction the arrow was pointing in (leftward or rightward) by 
pressing a button with either their left or right index finger, while maintaining fixation 
throughout the experiment.
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In Experiment 1 we manipulated the likelihood that the cue would appear either 
above or below fixation. In two groups of participants the cue was most likely to 
appear respectively above or below fixation. Consequently, participants in these two 
groups (N=78) encountered both trials where the cue was in the expected location 
(80%) as well as trials where it was in the unexpected location (20%). In a third 
group of participants (N=40) both cue locations were equally likely, resulting in these 
participants experiencing only neutral trials.
The stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) between the cue and target was set to 117 ms. 
The target remained onscreen until a response was given or until 1000 ms after target 
onset had passed. Trials were separated by a variable inter-trial interval of 750-1500 
ms. Participants responded to the arrows by pressing a button on a button box with 
their left or right index fingers, respectively for leftward and rightward pointing arrows.
In total the experiment lasted approximately one hour. Before starting with the main 
experimental task, participants received on-screen instructions and performed one 
practice block of 80 trials. Participant were told that the cue was irrelevant (i.e. non-
predictive of the target) and could be ignored. During the practice block participants 
received on-screen feedback (response correct or incorrect) on a trial-by-trials basis. 
Subsequently, participants performed 800 trials of the main task divided over 10 
blocks. After each block, participants received feedback about their task performance 
(overall percentage correct and number of late responses) and subsequently there 
was a short 20s break.
Behavioral analysis
Trials where the participants’ reaction time exceeded three standard deviations from 
the participants’ mean or was below 200 ms were discarded. Furthermore, trials on 
which no (relevant) response was given within 1 s from target onset were excluded 
from analyses. The remainder of the trials (98.3%) was exported to JASP [55] in order 
to perform statistical analyses. We analyzed the data using a combination of both 
frequentist statistics and their Bayesian equivalents [56,57].
For the statistical analyses of Experiment 1 we performed a 2 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the factors Validity (valid, invalid) and Expectation (expected, unexpected) 
for the reaction times. This analysis only considered participants for whom the cue 
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was more likely to appear in one of the locations (N=78). Participants in the neutral 
condition were included as a reference group, to be able to interpret possible 
performance differences as either gains or losses in performance with respect to an 
expectation-neutral context. In two independent samples t-tests we compared the 
validity effect size between the neutral condition and the expected or unexpected 
condition in the test group participants. In addition to frequentist analyses, we 
also computed Bayes Factors for all relevant comparisons. As we were specifically 
interested in the interaction between expectations and the bottom-up validity effect, 
the Bayes Factor (BF) for a model with only the main effects was compared to the BF 
for a model with the main effects and the interaction. The ratio of the BF values then 
quantifies the evidence for including the interaction term in the model, and hence 
can be interpreted as evidence for or against the existence of an interaction between 
the two experimental factors. BF ratios will converge either to infinity when a model 
including the interaction explains the data better, or to zero when it explains the data 
worse than a model with only main effects. If the ratio is close to one, this indicates 
that both models are equally likely and that there is not enough evidence for either 
conclusion. We use the conventions from Jeffreys [58] to interpret the evidence in our 
Bayesian analyses.
Results and discussion
We examined whether expectations about the spatial location of a cue modulate 
the ensuing attentional capture by this cue. In Figure 4.1B we plot the reaction time 
results for Experiment 1 for trials on which participants gave the correct answer. Higher 
reaction times on invalid than valid trials indicate there was attentional capture by the 
cue (RT difference=29.31 ms, F1,77=216.53, p<0.001, η
2=0.738). Importantly, however, 
this validity effect was not modulated by the spatial expectation participants had about 
the cue (F1,77=0.753, p=0.388). The evidence against the existence of this modulation 
is moderate (BF01=4.40). While spatial expectations did not modulate attentional 
capture, there was an overall reaction time benefit for trials where the cue was in 
the expected location compared to the unexpected location (RT difference=8.87 ms, 
F1,77=84.56, p<0.001, η2=0.523). Further post-hoc analyses showed that the validity 
effect in the neutral control group was not significantly different from that on either 
expected (t116=-0.96, p=0.338) or unexpected (t116=-1.15, p=0.252) trials for participants 
who had expectations about cues. Accuracy was close to ceiling level (98.21±1.21% 
correct) and is further reported and analyzed in the Supplementary material.
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Together, these results suggest that our manipulation of spatial expectations 
modulated overall behavioral speed and accuracy but did not result in a modulation 
of bottom-up attention capture. While this suggests that expectations do not interact 
with bottom-up attention, there are possible alternative explanations. Most notably, 
because targets and cues are often presented in the same location, and with only a 
short (117 ms) and predictable time delay between the two, suppressing processing 
at the cue location would possibly hamper target processing. Moreover, since the cue 
was temporally predictive of the target (fixed SOA), its presentation was informative 
about target onset and hence attending the cue at all times may have been useful for 
target perception. These considerations inspired Experiment 2, in which we examined 
whether cues still elicit bottom-up attention when they are temporally predictable but 
no longer predictive of when targets occur.
Figure 4.1: Task design and behavioral results of Experiment 1. (A) Trial structure of the exogenous 
cueing task used in Experiment 1. In every trial a cue (circular annulus) was presented for 50 ms, either 
above or below fixation. After an inter stimulus interval (ISI) of 67 ms (SOA 117 ms), a target (arrow) was 
presented in either the same (valid trials) or opposite (invalid trials) location. We manipulated spatial cue 
expectation by varying the likelihood the cue would appear in either location. In one group of participants 
the cue appeared equally often above and below fixation. In the two other groups the cue was more likely 
(80%) to appear in one of the locations. Target location was counterbalanced and unrelated to the cue 
location. Participants’ task was to report the direction the arrow was pointing in. (B) Reaction time results 
for Experiment 1. Only trials on which the correct answer was given were used for the analysis. On the left 
we show results for participants that expected the cue either above or below fixation (N=78), meaning 
that it was sometimes presented in the expected location and sometimes in the unexpected location. 
Participants were faster on valid than on invalid trials, regardless of their spatial expectations about the 
cue. For reference, we present the results for participants in the neutral group (N=40) on the right. Error 
bars represent SEM.
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Experiment 2: The effect of temporal expectations on bottom-up 
attention
Methods
Participants
We tested 67 participants in Experiment 2. Compared to Experiment 1, fewer 
participants were tested because a within-subjects design was used. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. We excluded four participants from 
Experiment 2 because button presses were not recorded properly. As a results, we 
included 63 participants (50 females, age 23.0±3.5 years) in the final analysis. The 
experiment was approved by the local ethics committee of the Radboud University 
(CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen; 2014/288 “Imaging Human Cognition”). Written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
We used the same materials as in Experiment 1, with as only exception that participants 
now used the computer keyboard (DELL KB522) to respond.
Procedure
Instead of manipulating spatial expectations about the cue, in Experiment 2 we 
manipulated temporal expectations. To remove standard temporal links between 
cues and targets, the task consisted of continuous blocks (duration 5 min) during 
which cues and targets were presented (Figure 4.2A). Temporal expectations were 
manipulated by varying the regularity of cue presentation onset between blocks. In 
the regular (expected condition) blocks, the cue would be presented every second 
(1 Hz presentation rate). In the irregular blocks (unexpected condition) cues were 
presented quasi-randomly every 0.5 – 1.5 seconds, with a uniform distribution over all 
possible intervals between two consecutive cues. This results in the participant having 
less (precise) information about the cue onset and the cue-target SOA. Targets lasted 
200 ms and were presented quasi-randomly every 1.0 to 2.5 seconds. Importantly, 
the onsets of cues and targets were determined completely independently of each 
other. Because the SOA between two targets was longer than between cues, not every 
cue was followed by a target. Participants used the ‘z’ and ‘/’ (slash) buttons on the 
keyboard to respond to leftward and rightward pointing arrow targets respectively.
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Participants completed 8 blocks of the task, switching between regular and irregular 
conditions after every two blocks. The initial condition was counterbalanced over 
participants. After every block there was a 20s break. If a condition switch occurred, 
this was explicitly mentioned on-screen at the end of the break. Participants were 
instructed that the cue was irrelevant to their task and could be ignored. Participants 
did not receive any feedback during the task. Together with the instructions and the 
practice block the experiment lasted approximately one hour.
A. Experiment 2: Task design
... ... ... ...
Cue Cue CueTarget Target
50 ms 50 ms50 ms 200 ms 200 ms
Regular:
Irregular: 
1000 ms
500-1500 ms
1000-2500 ms
...
Figure 4.2: Task design of Experiment 2. (A) Example stimulus sequence for Experiment 2. The task 
consisted of continuous blocks (duration 300s) during which cues and targets were presented. In some 
blocks cue presentation was regular and hence expectations about cue onset were strong. In other blocks 
cue presentation was less expectable. Again, participants’ task was to report the direction the target 
arrow was pointing in.
Behavioral analysis
During the experiment, the task was presented to participants in continuous streams, 
without a clearly discernible trial structure. For analyses purposes, trials were defined 
post-hoc by isolating at all target presentations (on average 1371 trials per participant). 
Data preprocessing was similar to Experiment 1 and resulted in the inclusion of 96.0% 
of trials. Subsequently, for each target presentation, we identified the temporal 
distance between the target and the closest preceding cue stimulus. This generated 
a total of 90 bins, spanning a cue-target SOA between 0 and 1500 ms, in 17 ms steps 
(SOAs above 1000 ms were infrequent, <10% of trials). The first button press after 
target presentation was recorded as the participants’ response. If no response was 
made within a 1000 ms interval following the target, the trial was classified as a “miss” 
trial.
Because the number of trials per condition was low (due to the large amount of possible 
SOA bins; on average 20.6 trials per SOA bin in Experiment 2 and 21.0 trials per SOA bin 
in Experiment 3), we smoothed the data in the temporal domain by applying a sliding 
window over all SOA bins of interest (SOAs below 500 ms). In this procedure, for every 
relevant combination of conditions, the data we ascribe to an SOA are computed as a 
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weighted average from that SOA (SOA0) and the two SOAs immediately preceding and 
following it (0.1*SOA-2+0.2*SOA-1+0.4*SOA0+0.2*SOA+1+0.1*SOA+2). Trials with an SOA 
between 0 ms and 50 ms were excluded from the analyses because on those trials cue 
and target presentation overlapped in time.
Based on the smoothed data, we computed the overall validity effect for each SOA. 
We then identified two SOAs of interest based on these data: (1) an early maximally 
facilitatory validity effect (SOA with a maximally positive overall validity effect); and 
(2) a late maximally inhibitory validity effect (SOA with a maximally negative overall 
validity effect). We then averaged the (non-smoothed) data around these SOAs of 
interest, using the selected SOA and the two SOA’s preceding or following it, to create 
an early and a late window of interest. Subsequently, we tested for an interaction 
between expectation and the bottom-up validity effect by performing a 2 x 2 repeated-
measures ANOVA with the factors Validity (valid, invalid) and Expectation (expected, 
unexpected) in each of these windows. In addition, like in Experiment 1 the Bayesian 
equivalent of the ANOVA was performed. Please note that since cue onsets and target 
onsets were determined independently, not every participant had observations for 
every condition at every SOA. In case data was missing in one of the conditions of an 
analysis, we excluded the respective participant from that analysis.
Results and discussion
We temporally smoothed the data over the different SOA bins (Figure 4.3A). 
Subsequently, we identified an early and late window where bottom-up attention 
effects were most prominent (see also Behavioral analyses). The windows can be 
interpreted as resulting from initial bottom-up attentional capture (early window), 
followed by inhibition of return (late window; [33]). In these windows, we tested for 
modulations by temporal expectations (Figure 4.3B and Figure 4.3C).
Like in Experiment 1, we observed strong evidence for bottom-up attentional capture 
as indexed by the validity effect (early window: RT difference=10.54 ms, F1,60=24.77, 
p<0.001, η2=0.292; late window: RT difference=-11.18 ms, F1,59=15.44, p<0.001, 
η2=0.207). Note that this effect is to be anticipated, since we chose our windows based 
on the validity effect size. Again, temporal expectations did not modulate bottom-up 
attentional capture, as shown by the absence of an influence of cue onset regularity 
on the validity effect (early window: F1,60=0.02, p=0.883; late window: F1,59=2.85, 
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A. Experiment 2: RT effects per SOA
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Figure 4.3: Behavioral results of Experiment 2. (A) The reaction time results and validity effect (invalid-
valid) (temporally smoothed) for SOA bins between 50 ms and 500 ms are shown for each of the relevant 
conditions. Below the graph, the time-periods that were isolated as windows (around 150 ms and 467 
ms) for further analyses are marked. (B) The validity effect (invalid-valid) results (temporally smoothed) 
after regularly and irregularly presented cues for SOA bins between 50 ms and 500 ms. The average 
reaction times per condition from the windows in (A) are presented in panel (C) for the early window and 
panel (D) for the late window. In both windows there was a significant validity effect that was not affected 
by temporal cue expectations. Error bars represent SEM.
p=0.097). The evidence against such modulations was moderate for the early window 
(BF01 = 5.14). For the late window, likely related to inhibition of return, there was only 
anecdotal evidence (BF01 = 2.27), suggesting the study’s power was not sufficient 
to make any strong claims about effects in this time window. Unlike Experiment 1, 
there was no significant main effect of expectations on reaction time (early window: 
F1,60=0.45, p=0.504; late window: F1,59=0.07, p=0.793). Overall participants’ task 
performance was close to ceiling (94.00±3.30%).
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Cues in the regular condition were temporally predictable but spatially unpredictable, 
i.e. they could equally likely occur above or below fixation. It is possible that cues need 
to be both temporally and spatially predictable for attentional capture to be reduced. 
This is what we set out to test in Experiment 3, in which we replicated Experiment 2 
while keeping the cue location constant.
Experiment 3: The role of temporal expectations in bottom-up 
attention for spatially predictable stimuli
Methods
Participants
We tested 61 participants in Experiment 3. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Two participants were excluded because their performance markedly 
(more than 3 standard deviations) worse than that of other subjects. In addition, 
one participant was excluded because of a failure to respond on more than 20% of 
the trials. In the end, 58 participants were included in the analyses (42 females, age 
22.7±3.5 years). The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee of the 
Radboud University (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen; 2014/288 “Imaging Human Cognition”) 
and written informed consent was obtained from all participants according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
The materials used were identical to those in Experiment 2.
Procedure
The design of Experiment 3 was largely similar to that of Experiment 2. The most 
notable difference is that now for each participant the cue location was kept constant 
throughout the task (Figure 4.4A). This allowed us to investigate effects of temporal 
expectations in a context where the distractor is spatially fully predictable. The cue 
location was counterbalanced across participants. To limit possible carry-over effects, 
we only switched between the regular and irregular conditions halfway through the 
experiment. In addition, a short practice block was included at the start of each of the 
conditions to get participants used to the change in task structure.
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Figure 4.4: Task design and behavioral results of Experiment 3. (A) Example stimulus sequence for 
Experiment 3. The task that was used was highly similar to that in Experiment 2. The main difference was 
that for each participant the cue was now consistently presented in one location, making it completely 
spatially expected. (B) The reaction time results (temporally smoothed) for SOA bins between 50 and 500 
ms are shown for each of the relevant conditions. (C) The validity effect (invalid-valid) results (temporally 
smoothed) after regularly and irregularly presented cues for SOA bins between 50 ms and 500 ms. At the 
bottom, the time-periods that were isolated as windows (around 150 ms and 483 ms) for further analyses 
are marked. In the early window (D) there was no significant bottom-up attentional capture, regardless 
of temporal expectations. The late window (E) did show a significant effect, but this inhibition of return 
effect was not modulated by temporal cue expectations. Error bars represent SEM.
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Behavioral analysis
Data preprocessing (97.0% of trials included) and statistical analyses were identical to 
Experiment 2.
Results and discussion
In this final experiment, we created a condition in which cues were both spatially and 
temporally fully predictable. Within each participant the cue now always appeared in 
a single location and thus was always spatially expected. After defining the windows 
of interest (similar analysis pipeline as Experiment 2; Figure 4.4B), we again tested 
whether temporal predictability modulated the bottom-up attention effects (Figure 
4.4D and Figure 4.4E). As in the previous experiments, no such modulations were 
found (early window: F1,55=1.40, p=0.241; late window: F1,57=0.96, p=0.331). The 
evidence against these interactions was moderate for both windows (early window: 
BF01=3.07; late window BF01=3.91). Similar to Experiment 2, there were no main effects 
of temporal cue expectations on reaction times (early window: F1,55=0.09, p=0.763; 
late window: F1,57=1.21, p=0.276). Surprisingly, while there was significant inhibition 
of return (late window validity effect: RT difference=-17.11ms, F1,57=30.38, p<0.001), 
there was no overall attentional capture in this experiment (early window validity 
effect: F1,55=0.09, p=0.763) and the evidence against the existence of such an effect 
was moderately strong (BF01=3.37). As in the previous experiments, participants’ 
overall task performance was near-ceiling (95.50±2.72%).
Comparisons between experiments
Because the experiments differed markedly in the expectations participants had about 
cues and the context in which those cues were presented, we compared the validity 
effect sizes between experiments. Therefore, we performed two post-hoc analyses in 
which we directly compared reaction time validity effects between experiments. To 
ensure maximal comparability, for Experiment 2 and 3 we take the validity effect at 
an SOA of 117 ms (after smoothing), which is the SOA that was used in Experiment 1. 
First, we compared Experiment 1 (only neutral trials; Figure 4.5A) and Experiment 2 
(Figure 4.5B). In terms of spatial expectations both are comparable (cue 50% in each 
location), but the experiments differ strongly in the temporal context in which stimuli 
are presented. Most notably, in Experiment 1 the SOA was fixed at 117 ms, while in 
Experiment 2 it was variable and unpredictable. Therefore, in Experiment 1 the cue 
was a good temporal predictor of target onset. A comparison of the validity effects by 
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means of an independent samples t-test shows a significantly smaller validity effect 
in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (t101=4.47, p<.001, d=.904). This is possibly 
explained by that fact that in Experiment 2 there was (1) less information about the 
onset of the target and (2) a lower likelihood (not after every cue) a target would appear.
Second, the absence of an initial bottom-up capture effect in Experiment 3 (Figure 
4.5C) could be potentially explained by the perfect predictability of cue locations in 
the experiment. Because in contrast to Experiment 3 cue location was unpredictable 
in Experiment 2, the comparison between those experiments can be used to test 
this hypothesis. An independent samples t-test showed that there was no significant 
difference between the validity effects (t119=1.182, p=0.240). Therefore, we did not 
find evidence that the bottom-up validity effect is modulated by spatial expectations 
about the cue. This conceptually replicates our findings of Experiment 1. However, 
it should be noted that there is only anecdotal evidence (BF01=2.75) that the validity 
effects of Experiment 2 and 3 were of equal size and these results should thus be 
interpreted with caution.
Discussion
In a series of three behavioral experiments we investigated whether bottom-up 
attentional capture is modulated by stimulus expectations. We did not observe 
empirical support for this hypothesis. On the contrary, in all experiments we found 
moderately strong evidence that the bottom-up validity effects were of comparable size 
when cue stimuli were expected, compared to when they were not (or less) expected.
R
T 
(m
s)
500
375
400
425
450
475
R
T 
(m
s)
500
375
400
425
450
475
C. Experiment 3 (SOA = 117 ms)B. Experiment 2 (SOA = 117 ms)
Valid
Invalid
Valid
Invalid
Valid
Invalid
A. Experiment 1 (neutral trials)
R
T 
(m
s)
500
375
400
425
450
475
Figure 4.5: Comparing overall validity effects between experiments. For each of the experiments, we 
display the average reaction times on valid and invalid trials for the selections of trials that were used 
to compare validity effects between the experiments. (A) Only the neutral condition of Experiment 1 
(control group) was used. The SOA in this experiment was fixed at 117 ms. For experiment 2 (B) and 3 (C) 
we only used the data we obtained for the SOA of 117 ms after smoothing the SOA time courses. Error 
bars represent SEM.
85
Chapter 4  • Cue predictability does not modulate bottom-up attentional capture
The fact that participants were overall faster on expected compared to unexpected 
trials in Experiment 1 suggests that participants did form prior expectations, which 
had a sizeable influence on behavior. Based on studies showing that stimuli embedded 
in regular streams are better detected [37], we anticipated to see a similar main effect 
of expectation for the temporal paradigm in Experiment 2 and 3. Contrary to our 
predictions, we did not observe this effect, even though regular and irregular blocks 
were visibly different and every switch between conditions was explicitly marked in 
the participants’ instructions. Other studies have used similar paradigms with streams 
of stimulation to investigate effects of temporal expectations and did find effects of 
temporal regularity on subsequent behavioral performance [164,170]. Nevertheless, 
temporal expectations about cues do not appear to influence the processing of 
subsequently presented target stimuli in situations where targets are salient and 
uncoupled from the cues.
Assuming that our manipulations of expectations actually instantiated priors in our 
subjects, the absence of any significant interaction between expectations and bottom-
up attention in our experiments is surprising, because it contradicts the hypothesis that 
unexpected or surprising events capture attention (more) [155,157,158]. Interestingly, 
two recent studies observed that distractor predictability can modulate the amount of 
attentional capture in a visual search task, where target and distractor are presented 
concurrently [171,172]. The most notable difference in task design between their 
study and ours, is that in their paradigm distractors and targets were presented 
simultaneously on different locations of the screen, resulting in direct attentional 
competition between the stimuli. This competition can be biased by predictability. 
In contrast, in our studies we examine the consequences of presenting a salient cue 
stimulus in isolation on subsequent visual processing at that location. We find that the 
attention grabbing properties of such a cue are not modulated by predictability. In line 
with our findings, a recent study by Southwell and colleagues has also suggested that 
regular and random streams are equally salient [168]. Moreover, our results are in 
line with the stimulus-driven account of bottom-up attention [146,173], in which it is 
assumed that the initial capture of attention is automatic and independent from top-
down factors. However, it must be noted that even within the stimulus-driven account 
there would have been room for expectations to suppress the effects of distracting 
inputs (i.e., the uninformative cues) at later processing stages [148,165].
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One conceivable alternative explanation for the absence of effects of expectation 
on attentional capture is that the tasks we used were too simple. Participant’s 
performance was close to ceiling (>90%) in all experiments. As a result, ignoring or 
suppressing the uninformative cues may not have been required in order to perform 
well. Indeed, recent studies [166,174] showed that attentional capture was only 
suppressed if task requirements were such that capture would interfere with target 
processing. Moreover, a study in macaques showed that modulations of V1 attention 
responses was larger for tasks that were more difficult [156].
Furthermore, a recent study has suggested that only fully spatially predictable 
distractors may be suppressed at an early processing stage [175]. This hints at the 
possibility that our manipulation of expectations, especially in Experiment 1, was 
not potent enough to influence bottom-up capture. It is possible that with a stronger 
manipulation of expectations (i.e., making cues even more likely in one condition and 
less likely in the other) we would have observed a modulation of capture. Still, this 
cannot fully explain the absence of an effect in Experiment 1: even in Experiment 3 
when cue stimuli were perfectly predictable in terms of timing, location and visual 
characteristics, no significant modulation of the validity effect was found.
It is noteworthy that ignoring or suppressing the uninformative cues in our tasks may 
generally not have been a useful strategy. It is conceivable that participants did not 
inhibit the cue location at any point in a trial, because a target would often (50%) be 
presented in the same location with only a short time-delay. As a consequence, ignoring 
one location systematically would be detrimental to target detection. Moreover, the 
fixed SOA in Experiment 1 resulted in cue onset being perfectly predictive of target 
onset time. Hence, paying attention to an informative cue, instead of ignoring it, was 
actually a viable strategy. Consequently, in all experiments the tasks we used may have 
had factors that made participants attend cues (instead of ignore them). In addition, 
cues and targets were both defined as abrupt onset stimuli, meaning cue features to 
some extent overlapped with the searched-for target feature [147]. It is conceivable 
that this overlap caused attention to be captured regardless of experimental condition. 
As a result, potential effects may have been obscured because task set did not optimally 
support suppression of uninformative cues [153].
We observed a significant difference in the amount of attentional capture between 
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Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. While it is difficult to directly compare both experiments 
because they differed on several dimensions, a likely candidate explanation for this 
difference is the fact that in Experiment 2 there was more (temporal) uncertainty about 
the onset of the targets, as well as an overall lower likelihood of target appearance. It 
is conceivable that participants deploy a different strategy in Experiment 2 compared 
to Experiment 1, in which they focus more on the targets and less on the cues (because 
those are less/not informative), which in turn leads to the cue having less influence on 
subsequent target processing. Future studies are required to test this idea.
In conclusion, we did not find evidence for modulations of bottom-up capture by spatial 
or temporal expectations about the cue. We therefore conclude that, at least in the 
exogenous cueing tasks we used, bottom-up attentional capture does not seem to be 
altered by prior knowledge about the location or time point of the distracting inputs. 
This calls into question perceptual surprise as an explanation for bottom-up attention. 
Future research may use more difficult tasks in which the relationship between 
targets and distractors can be more carefully controlled. In addition, we believe 
electrophysiological studies could possibly disentangle the effects of expectation and 
attention and precisely point at their interactions with high temporal resolution.
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Experiment 1
Participants’ performance was higher on expected than unexpected trials 
(Supplementary Figure 4.1A; F1,77=5.02, p=0.028, η2=0.061). However, there was no 
Supplementary material: Percentage correct results
Supplementary Figure 4.1: Percentage correct results. (A) Percentage correct responses in Experiment 1. 
On the left we show results for participants that expected the cue either above or below fixation (N=78), 
meaning that it was sometimes presented in the expected location and sometimes in the unexpected 
location. For reference, we present the results for participants in the neutral group (N=40) on the right. 
Below, we present the percentage correct results for Experiment 2 (BC) and Experiment 3 (DE), separately 
for the early and late time windows. Error bars represent SEM.
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validity effect (F1,77=2.10, p=0.152), regardless of spatial expectations about the cue 
(F1,77=0.56, p=0.458).
Experiment 2
We used the same time-windows as for the reaction time analyses. Percentage 
correct was not significantly affected by temporal expectations (early window: 
F1,60=1.22, p=0.275; late window: F1,61=0.28, p=0.596). Cue validity did impact on task 
performance, but only in the late time window (early window: F1,60=1.10, p=0.299; 
late window: F1,61=12.93, p<0.001, η2=0.175). Moreover, the validity effect size was 
not significantly modulated by temporal expectations about the cue in either of the 
windows (early window: F1,60=3.29, p=0.075; late window: F1,61=0.03, p=0.873).
Experiment 3
We again used the same time-windows for the accuracy analyses as for the reaction 
time analyses. Expectations had a significant effect on participants’ performance in 
the early window (F1,55=4.25, p=0.044, η2=0.072) but not in the late time window 
(F1,57=2.31, p=0.134). In both windows, the validity of the cue significantly affected 
performance (early window: F1,55=5.36, p=0.024, η2=0.089; late window: F1,57=23.32, 
p<0.001, η2=0.290). Importantly though, in neither of the windows this validity effect 
was modulated by temporal expectations (early window: F1,55=2.19, p=0.145; late 
window: F1,57=0.80, p=0.374).

5
General discussion
92
Chapter 5  •  General discussion
In this thesis, I aimed to gain important insight in how perceptual expectations relate 
to conscious awareness and bottom-up attention. In particular, I wanted to answer the 
following questions:
1. Can expectations boost an otherwise unseen stimulus into conscious awareness?
2. Are expectations automatic brain computations, taking place irrespective of
 conscious access?
3. How do expectations affect the neural processing of visual stimuli and how
 does this relate to conscious access?
4. To what extent is bottom-up attentional capture determined by perceptual
 expectations?
Below, I will summarize the empirical findings reported in the previous chapters and 
interpret them within the context of different theories that postulate perception is an 
active process in which the brain tries to make sense of the outside world by forming 
prior expectations about it [8].
Expectations boost conscious access
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I reported a series of experiments in which the attentional 
blink paradigm was employed to investigate the influence of top-down expectations 
on conscious perception. In the attentional blink paradigm, the second of two targets 
is often missed when it is presented shortly after a first target that was detected [20]. 
I tested whether making the initial target (T1) predictive of the second target (T2) 
would help or harm participants overcome this limitation in conscious access. All 
those experiments, regardless of subtle design differences between them, supported 
the conclusion that stimuli confirming expectations are more likely to be consciously 
perceived than stimuli violating expectations. Moreover, in Chapter 3 I showed that the 
expectation effect was mainly driven by a performance benefit for valid expectations. 
This facilitatory effect was strongest in the time window where conscious perception is 
usually most impaired in the attentional blink task [20]. Overall, this puts put forward 
the idea that expectations are able to boost otherwise unseen stimuli into conscious 
awareness.
Together with other studies showing effects of top-down expectations on conscious 
stimulus detection, the results I reported are in line with claims derived from 
prominent predictive brain theories [2,3,30]. In these theories, the brain is thought to 
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actively interpret incoming evidence in light of expectations based on a “hypothesis” 
of what the outside world looks like. Conscious perception is assumed to reflect the 
hypothesis best fitting the incoming evidence at any given moment (while taking into 
account the precision of the model). At that time point, this is the model probably 
best representing the outside world [30,40]. In the example of the attentional blink 
task used here, when a “D” is presented and when it is a priori expected, it is more 
likely that the hypothesis “D” is the one best explaining the sensory input. On the 
other hand, if a “K” was expected and a “D” was presented, the overall evidence for 
the hypothesis that there is a “D” in the outside world is less strong, making it less 
likely that this hypothesis explains the sensory input well enough to be consciously 
perceived.
The fact that expectations had a stronger effect at short lags, when conscious target 
perception is least likely, can potentially be explained by a behavioral ceiling effect 
when T2 targets were presented late in a trial. In the attentional blink paradigm, 
overall performance for T2 targets presented at long lags is often high, leaving little 
room for improvement. Another interesting (not mutually exclusive) possibility is that 
the relative impact of expectations may be larger at short lags because the sensory 
input is weighted less. That is, at early lags, when attention “blinks”, sensory input is 
imprecise and therefore weighted less. As a result, prior expectations have a greater 
impact on what the “winning” perceptual hypothesis is and therefore on what one 
consciously perceives (and responds). This hypothesis can be tested by manipulating 
the attentional resources for the processing of T2 in a controlled way, for example by 
varying the salience of T1 and thereby changing the “blink rate” at a certain lag. In 
addition, one could compare this to a situation in which the bottom-up input for the 
relevant target is actually reduced, in which case one would also expect the effect of 
expectations to be larger [176].
To be able to better isolate the effect of expectation from other (e.g. attentional) 
effects, it could be interesting to change the predictive stimuli in the task to another 
stimulus than T1. In the current attentional blink paradigm, the T1 had two conflicting 
effects on perception of T2. On the one hand, seeing (and attending to) T1 of course 
impaired detection of T2 (standard attentional blink effect). However, seeing T1 also 
allowed forming an expectation about T2, actually facilitating its conscious perception 
if the expectation was valid. As a result, if for example the stimulus was not consciously 
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perceived, this could be due to either a strong perception of T1, drawing away attention 
from T2, or to a weak perception of T1, not allowing the forming of an expectation. 
Alternatively, adding manipulations of bottom-up stimulus strength could also help to 
improve understanding of the roles of bottom-up and top-down factors in conscious 
perception.
A note on response bias
Using target discrimination tasks to measure subjective perceptual experience, such as 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, has often been criticized [177]. While the ability to report 
the correct target seems to imply conscious perception, part of the observed effect 
may be (partially) driven by decision or response bias effects. That is, participants 
may regularly report the target letter they expected to see, regardless of whether 
they have genuinely seen it. Some of the additional analyses reported in Chapter 3 
indicated that a part of the behavioral effect of expectations is likely driven by such 
biases. However, in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 I have also reported a bias-free 
outcome measure for which effects of expectations were qualitatively the same but 
only somewhat weaker. Therefore, it is not likely that biases can explain the full pattern 
of expectation-related results.
Nevertheless, I think future work could be done to better isolate the effect of 
expectations on conscious access from potential biases. In order to do this, it is 
important to use a response dimension that is entirely orthogonal to the manipulation 
of top-down expectations. One way to do this is simply asking participants to indicate 
whether or not they have seen the target stimulus. The manipulation of expectations 
about the features of upcoming visual stimuli cannot lead to any bias in determining 
whether a stimulus was presented at all. Another promising approach, similarly 
unbiased, would be to ask participants to rate the subjective strength of the targets, 
such as done with the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) [79]. Still, it is advisable to 
always verify the trustworthiness of participants’ responses against more objective 
measures, since they may not always reliably reflect their percept (i.e. participants 
rate an expected percept higher, regardless of actual perceptual strength).
Automaticity of perceptual expectations
Theories about the predictive brain often suggest that expectations are intrinsic 
and automatic brain computations, implemented by feedback loops originating in 
95
Chapter 5  •  General discussion
higher-order brain areas [9]. However, this seems incompatible with consciousness 
theories (see Box 1.1), which implicate similar top-down feedback mechanisms in the 
establishment of conscious perception. In Chapter 2 I have reported two experiments 
that directly investigated the interaction between consciousness and expectations. 
Specifically, we investigated to what extent predictive processing was dependent on 
conscious awareness of either the predictive stimulus (here: T1) or the target stimulus 
(here: T2).
In an EEG experiment employing the attentional blink task, expectation violations 
were related to a frontal ERP component. Interestingly, this component was similar 
for trials on which T2 was seen and trials where on which it was missed. This indicates 
that the brain recognizes and signals simple violations of expectations in the absence 
of conscious awareness. Such findings are in line with theories about the predictive 
brain that assume that expectation-related processes are intrinsic brain computations 
that happen automatically. In as far as the signals supporting this process are purely 
driven by a strong feedforward sweep, this could also be in line with theories about 
consciousness. More research is needed in order to find out how complex expectations 
can be while still being processed outside of conscious awareness.
Contrary to the findings in the previous paragraph, a behavioral study in Chapter 2 
showed that conscious perception of T1, initiating the expectation, was a prerequisite 
for later influences of this stimulus on conscious perception of T2. When T1 was not 
seen, the validity of the expectation did not modulate T2 perception. This shows 
that even after participants were explicitly made aware of the predictive relationship 
between T1 and T2, these expectations could not be implemented outside of 
conscious awareness. These findings are in line with theories about consciousness: it 
is likely that if T1 is not consciously perceived, a lack of recurrent processing between 
brain areas prevents implementation of any expectation [17,178]. On the contrary, the 
requirement of conscious perception for the implementation of expectations is more 
difficult to explain in light of predictive brain in which expectations are seen as intrinsic 
and automatic brain computations. Based on these assumptions, one would have 
expected that conscious perception of a stimulus is not required for it to influence 
predictive processing at a later time-point.
Nonetheless, even when one assumes expectations are intrinsic brain processes, it 
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is conceivable that the extent to which they are implemented is affected by many 
factors. For example, maybe only more basic, low-level expectations can be processes 
outside of awareness, because they rely less on long-range interactive processing in 
the brain. Indeed, there is some evidence that simpler expectations can be processed 
unconsciously [100]. As mentioned before, in our task, expectations were defined on 
a relatively high level for which it is more likely that conscious processing is required. 
Future work may focus on describing the limits of nonconscious predictive processing, 
and how this depends on the type, and complexity of the expectations. For example, 
it would be interesting to see if nonconscious expectation effects can be obtained in 
the attentional blink paradigm if more automatized (overlearned) expectations are 
employed. This could be achieved by training participants even more extensively then 
was currently done. Alternatively, one could take advantage of existing automatized 
conditional relationships, for example by presenting targets in alphabetical order.
Finally, it is likely that nonconscious stimuli generally instantiate weaker expectations, 
leading to them only being “available” on shorter time scales (e.g. [101]). In the 
task used in Chapter 2, the time between the T1 and T2 was minimally 275 ms. It 
is possible that nonconscious expectation effects would have been observed on a 
shorter time scale, because there is a lower chance the expectation has already “faded 
away”. A recent study in which shorter lags were used (92 ms) does not support this 
idea [Alilovic et al., in preparation]. Even at the shortest lag, there was no evidence 
that nonconsciously perceived T1 stimuli introduced effects of expectation validity 
on subsequent conscious perception of the T2 target. More research is needed to 
investigate what the time-course of nonconscious predictive processing is. Moreover, 
it would be interesting to track these processes in the brain using neuroimaging, to see 
to what extent they depend on feedforward or feedback neural processing.
Neural mechanisms underlying the “boosting” effect of 
expectations
In Chapter 2, I investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the “boosting” effect of 
expectations on conscious perception by investigating signal amplitude as measured by 
EEG. Surprisingly, no reliable neural interactions between expectations and conscious 
perception were observed. That is, in contrast to suggestions by other studies (e.g. 
[45]), expectation-related modulations of signal amplitude did not relate to changes 
in conscious access. In the discussion of this chapter, I hypothesized that it may not be 
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overall signal amplitude, but the “sharpness” of neural representations that is affected 
by expectations and leads to enhanced conscious perception.
This is what I set out to test in the MEG study reported in Chapter 3. Using a separate 
localizer task, it was possible to reliably decode the identity of targets presented 
within the attentional blink task. However, the representations we picked up were not 
modulated by expectations and hence cannot readily explain their behavioral impact. 
At a first glance, these findings appear to contradict intuitions based on predictive brain 
theories that expected signals should have improved neural representations (as in e.g. 
[6]). Nevertheless, this may not necessarily be the case. Participants’ expectations in 
the attentional blink task were defined on a “semantic level” rather than a “perceptual” 
level. As a result, it is possible that expectations in our task impacted on conscious 
perception at a relatively high higher cortical level. However, the decoding analyses 
in Chapter 3 were only sensitive to relatively early sensory parts of the processing of 
target letters. When a classifier was trained on an independent oddball task, decoding 
in the attentional blink task was only possible roughly 100-375 ms after stimulus onset 
and was likely based on posterior MEG channels. This is probably due to the fleeting 
nature of stimulus representations in the oddball task, where the stimulus identity 
was not task-relevant. As a consequence, the hypothesis that expectations affect 
processing of targets at later levels could not be tested in the current dataset and 
warrants more research. 
The suggestion that expectations may affect conscious perception at higher levels of 
the cortical hierarchy is supported by modelling work in which visibility decisions were 
related to processing at a late stages of the perceptual processing hierarchy [44,179]. 
They also make sense in the context of theories about consciousness, which usually 
implicate high cortical areas, such as prefrontal cortex, in conscious processing. This 
begs the question whether an area like the (pre)frontal cortex is necessarily at the top 
of the perceptual processing hierarchy. Predictive brain theories like predictive coding 
do not require a single specific brain region at the top of this hierarchy. Still, it is often 
assumed that conscious perception is supported by an optimization of perceptual 
hypotheses across the cortical hierarchy [30]. This implies optimization of hypotheses 
at all levels, including high-level hypotheses. Such a process is likely supported by a 
propagation of neural signals up to the higher cortical areas that process these high-
level hypotheses, where neural representations are likely more stable [122]. While 
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this of course does not directly provide evidence for a causal link between frontal 
cortical activations and conscious processing, at least it suggests that, and explains 
why, conscious access may often go hand in hand with activations at the top of the 
cortical hierarchy, such as in (pre)frontal cortex.
Alternative mechanisms supporting the role of expectations in conscious perception
Obviously, it is not possible, based on empirical results of two experiments only, to 
rule out that perceptual expectations cause variations in signal amplitude or neural 
representations that support the facilitatory effect of expectations on conscious 
perception. In fact, there is some evidence that signal amplitude or signal latency can 
be modulated by previous experience while also being related to conscious perception 
[42,45]. Still, it is also possible that behavioral expectation effects are related to other 
neural factors. One interesting aspect of the neural data to look at, which may even be 
possible within the existing datasets, could be the variability (i.e. standard deviation) 
of the neural signal [114,115]. Maybe expectations increase the stability of neural 
responses, which may in turn lead to more reliable or stable percepts in both space 
and time.
A majority of recent studies has focused on the role of pre-stimulus oscillatory 
activity in conscious perception. In particular, the pre-stimulus phase and amplitude 
of alpha-oscillations have been related to the conscious perception of visual stimuli 
[124,125,141,180]. An exciting new line of research has shown that these neural 
markers may also be modulated by top-down factors like expectations [143,144,181]. 
More research is needed here to isolate the effects of prior expectations from that of 
more general top-down influences, such as attention (which is often related to alpha 
oscillations). As a side note, one should realize that the presentation rate of stimuli 
in the attentional blink paradigm (in my tasks around 11 items/second) lies in the 
alpha range, making it difficult to disentangle effects of intrinsic neural oscillations 
from mere entrainment by the 11Hz stimulus presentation protocol. Still, presenting 
stimuli in alternative frequency ranges has been shown to reduce the overall size of the 
attentional blink [182], and the blink phenomenon may in fact depend on entrainment 
to stimuli presentations in the alpha-band [183].
Expectations do not modulate bottom-up attentional capture
In Chapter 4, I investigated how bottom-up attentional capture interacts with 
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expectations. In a series of three behavioral experiments using modified exogenous 
cueing paradigms [33,34], I investigated to what extent temporal or spatial expectations 
about the cue would influence this cues’ influence on targets presented shortly 
afterwards. Surprisingly, no modulations of attentional capture by cue expectations 
were observed in any of the experiments. Since our manipulation of expectations 
instantiated priors in our subjects, this suggests that bottom-up attentional capture 
was not altered by prior knowledge about the location or time point of potentially 
distracting inputs, highlighting the relatively automatic, involuntary nature of bottom-
up attention [146,173]. The absence of an interactive effect between top-down 
expectations and attentional capture cannot be easily interpreted within the context 
of predictive brain theories. Based on those, one would expect that either predictable 
[37] or unpredictable [157] inputs would be “preferentially processed”, and therefore 
capture attention. Our evidence supports neither theory, and suggests that bottom-up 
attention and expectation may not be strongly related [168].
Recent studies have shown that disengagement from attentional capture by distracting 
stimuli is an active process [184]. It is possible that expectations affect both attentional 
capture and the active suppression of such influences, but under different conditions. 
Maybe in our task an expected stimulus initially attracted more attention, but was 
subsequently also better suppressed. In the experimental tasks used in Chapter 4, 
this would be hard to disentangle because only performance for the target stimulus 
is measured and therefore only an indirect measure of the processing of the cue 
is available. I would suggest that future studies employ neuroimaging methods, 
preferably with high temporal resolution, to be better able to tease apart effects on 
attentional capture itself, effects on suppression of this capture and subsequent effect 
on target processing in real-time.
In addition, it may be interesting to look at the type of expectations that are used in 
a task. Here, we looked at the temporal and spatial predictability of visual stimuli, 
thereby always having expectations that were independent of the feature dimension 
participants responded to. Maybe if we would have manipulated the expectations on 
a feature level, like in the other chapters in this thesis, we would have found effects 
of expectations on attentional capture because the expectations were more relevant. 
That is, if it is assumed that attentional capture is a way for the system to “snap out 
of active inference” [30], then it is likely that this would depend on the (estimated) 
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behavioral relevance of incoming information. In Chapter 4, the variability of 
expectedness of cues in different conditions may have been too low to be behaviorally 
relevant. Moreover, the tasks were all quite easy, making any active suppression of 
distracting cues more-or-less irrelevant and hence participants may not have invested 
in doing this.
While we found evidence that conscious processing was modulated by perceptual 
expectations in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, no such evidence was found for attentional 
processes in Chapter 4. When considering the idea that conscious processing is closely 
linked to attention (e.g. [23]), the findings reported here may seem contradictory. 
However, this is not necessarily the case because conscious processing is often 
assumed to be related to top-down attention and not bottom-up attention. The 
current findings may support the idea that bottom-up and top-down attention are 
independent and affect, or are affected by, expectations differently. That is, perceptual 
expectations could be correlated only to the top-down attentional processes that later 
affect conscious awareness, without at the same time affecting bottom-up attentional 
capture.
Conclusion
In summary, the studies I have reported in this thesis show that top-down 
expectations have a significant impact on conscious access. They have the potential 
to boost otherwise not perceived stimuli into consciousness. No evidence that these 
behavioral effects were supported by changes in signal amplitude or early neural 
representations was found, but preliminary evidence suggests that the boost in 
conscious access may relate to later decisional processes. While prediction errors 
can be generated in the absence of conscious awareness, conscious awareness 
may be essential for the implementation of at least some types of expectations. 
Finally, although expectations clearly affected conscious access, no evidence 
for a relationship between expectations and bottom-up attention was found, 
suggesting these are independent processes and furthermore underscoring the 
reflexive nature of bottom-up attention.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
In het dagelijks leven hebben we gewoonlijk de ervaring dat we de wereld om ons 
heen natuurgetrouw waarnemen. Deze subjectieve ervaring is echter onjuist. Het is 
al lang bekend dat onze waarneming geen passieve registratie van de buitenwereld 
is. Waarneming moet eerder gezien worden als een actief proces, waarbij het brein 
probeert binnenkomende zintuiglijke signalen te begrijpen. Onze waarneming is 
daardoor minstens zo veel een interpretatie als een representatie van de buitenwereld.
Recent is gesuggereerd dat het brein bij de interpretatie van zintuiglijke signalen 
gebruik maakt van eerder opgedane kennis. Mede op basis van deze kennis kan het 
brein verwachtingen vormen over mogelijke toekomstige zintuigelijke input. Na het 
horen van geblaf kan een verwachting worden gevormd dat je waarschijnlijk een 
hond gaat zien, en niet een kat. Zo kunnen nieuwe signalen snel en efficiënt worden 
verwerkt. Theorieën die dit aannemen spreken ook wel over “the predictive brain”, 
ofwel “het voorspellende brein”. Hoewel basisprincipes van deze theorieën worden 
ondersteund door veel wetenschappelijk onderzoek, zijn er ook nog veel aspecten 
van de theorieën waarover niet alles duidelijk is. Zo is nog niet veel bekend over de 
manier waarop verwachtingen in het “voorspellende brein” samenhangen met andere 
processen, zoals aandacht en bewustzijn. In dit proefschrift staan zeven experimenten 
waarin binnen de context van visuele waarneming onderzoek is gedaan naar deze 
verbanden.
Visuele verwachtingen en bewuste waarneming
In Hoofdstuk 2 en Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift wordt gekeken naar de relatie 
tussen visuele verwachtingen en bewuste waarneming. Daarbij wordt gebruik gemaakt 
van de zogeheten “attentional blink” taak. In deze taak zien proefpersonen telkens een 
stroom van letters die zeer snel na elkaar (ongeveer elke tiende van een seconde) 
worden gepresenteerd. Een aantal letters van het alfabet zijn vooraf aangewezen als 
zogenaamde targets (= doelstimuli). Proefpersonen moeten deze targets detecteren 
binnen de stroom van letters. Als er een enkel target is kunnen proefpersonen dit bijna 
altijd probleemloos vinden. Eerder onderzoek heeft echter laten zien dat als na zo’n 
target snel nog een ander target wordt gepresenteerd, dit tweede target vaak niet 
bewust wordt waargenomen.
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Onze versie van de taak was dusdanig gemanipuleerd dat het eerste target voorspelde 
wat het tweede target waarschijnlijk zou zijn. Dit werd bereikt door elk eerste target 
te koppelen aan een tweede target dat vaak op dit eerste target volgde, dus een “G” 
werd bijvoorbeeld in 75% van de gevallen gevolgd door een “K”, terwijl een “H” vaak 
werd gevolgd door een “D” en juist bijna nooit door een “K”. Deze patronen zorgden 
ervoor dat proefpersonen na het zien van het eerste target een verwachting hadden 
wat het meest waarschijnlijke opvolgende target zou zijn. De vraag die hierbij werd 
gesteld was of deze verwachtingen invloed zouden hebben op het aantal targets dat 
proefpersonen bewust waar zouden nemen.
In een reeks aan experimenten lieten de resultaten keer op keer zien dat een juiste 
verwachting proefpersonen hielp om het tweede target bewust waar te nemen. We 
wilden ook graag weten welk proces in het brein hieraan ten grondslag lag. Onze 
hypothese was dat verwachtingen zorgen voor een efficiëntere verwerking van visuele 
signalen in gebieden van het brein die relatief vroeg betrokken zijn bij de verwerking 
van visuele signalen. Deze hypothese testten we met twee neuroimagingexperimenten, 
waarin we met EEG of MEG afgeleiden van elektrische activiteit in het brein meten. 
In tegenstelling tot onze hypothese, vonden we suggesties dat het gunstige effect van 
verwachtingen op bewuste waarneming gerelateerd was aan beslisprocessen in het 
brein die in een relatief laat stadium plaatsvinden.
In de taak kan het voorkomen dat een proefpersoon verwacht een bepaalde 
target letter (bijvoorbeeld “D”) te gaan zien, terwijl uiteindelijk een andere letter 
(bijvoorbeeld “K”) wordt gepresenteerd. Onverwachte gebeurtenissen, zoals het zien 
van een dergelijk “onverwacht” target, leiden vaak tot een “mismatch signaal” dat 
we met EEG kunnen meten. Dit signaal laat zien dat het brein heeft geconstateerd 
dat de verwachtte en daadwerkelijke zintuiglijke input (zoals hier de letter) niet 
met elkaar overeenkwamen. Opvallend genoeg was dit signaal even sterk wanneer 
proefpersonen niet konden aangeven welke target letter ze gezien hadden. Bewuste 
waarneming van een target lijkt dus geen voorwaarde voor de vergelijking van input 
met eerder gemaakte verwachtingen. Het feit dat dit validatieproces onbewust kan 
plaatsvinden, suggereert dat het een relatief automatisch proces is.
In een laatste experiment zorgden we ervoor dat proefpersonen het eerste target, 
waarop ze hun verwachting moesten baseren, regelmatig niet bewust konden 
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waarnemen. Als proefpersonen het eerste target niet bewust hadden waargenomen, 
maakte de voorspellende waarde van dit target niet meer uit. Een visuele stimulus 
moet dus bewust zijn waargenomen om op basis van deze stimulus voorspellingen te 
kunnen maken welke toekomstige waarnemingen te verwachten zijn.
Visuele verwachtingen en aandacht
In een andere reeks van drie experimenten, in Hoofdstuk 4, werd gekeken naar 
de relatie tussen visuele verwachtingen en “bottom-up” aandacht. Dit is aandacht 
die door externe gebeurtenissen wordt gestuurd. In een bekende “bottom-up” 
aandachtstaak wordt gekeken hoe het presenteren van een visuele stimulus op een 
bepaalde locatie in het visuele gezichtsveld (in experimenten vaak een plaats op het 
computerscherm) vervolgens leidt tot het richten van aandacht op die locatie. Stel 
je bijvoorbeeld een lamp voor die plotseling aangaat: welke factoren bepalen of je 
vervolgens extra aandacht hebt voor de locatie waar deze lamp zich bevindt. Onze 
hypothese was dat vooral onverwachte signalen (de verdeling van) aandacht zouden 
sturen. We vonden hier echter geen bewijs voor: elke stimulus trok de aandacht steeds 
evenveel, ongeacht of deze stimulus qua locatie of timing te verwachtten was. Er lijkt 
dus geen relatie te zijn tussen visuele verwachtingen en “bottom-up” aandacht.
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The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students 
in biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine 
and related disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the 
enrolment of the best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni 
show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, 
e.g. Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, 
MPI Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, 
North Western University, Northeastern University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of 
Vienna etc.. Positions outside academia spread among the following sectors: specialists 
in a medical environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. 
Specialists in a psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, 
psychological diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or 
lecturers. A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, analysts or 
head of research and development. Fewer graduates stay in a research environment 
as lab coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities are 
positions in the IT sector and management position in pharmaceutical industry. In 
general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with high-quality positions 
that play an important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit: 
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/



